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INTRODUCTION
Systemic differences in terms of political, social and 
economic values have not always prevented nations from 
collaborating with each other nor have affinity in values 
prevented them from fighting with each other. Nevertheless 
when the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation symbolising a closer relationship between the 
two states was signed on August 9, 1971 it created a flutter 
among observers of politics among states.
It evoked an impassioned debate, both in India and the 
West at large. At the esoteric level the discussions involved 
philosophical polemics amongst the erudite about the 
parameters of nonalignment. Interest focussed on theoretical 
questions relating to the nature, scope and relevance of 
nonalignment and on such matters as the similarities and 
differences between nonalignment and neutralism. At the 
much more substantive level the issue that stimulated responses 
from all and sundry was whether the treaty could be interpreted 
as a visible manifestation of India's new status as a Soviet 
client. While the passions generated in the wake of the 
treaty have long since subsided the shadow cast by the 
substantive issue has lingered on.
This sub-thesis is an enquiry on that enduring theme.
The primary purpose is to evaluate whether India's close 
relationship with the Soviet Union constrained Indian foreign
2policy postures and enhanced dependence^- on the Soviet Union 
economically and in the sphere of arms trade. In other words 
the sub-thesis is an assessment of the autonomy and dependence 
in India's relations with the Soviet Union.
In pursuit of the aims outlined above the operation of 
Indo-Soviet relations during the first decade of the treaty 
relationship is reviewed from the vantage point of the 19 80s.
The sub-thesis does not pretend to be a comprehensive 
account of Indo-Soviet relations from August 1971 to July 1981. 
Instead of covering the entire gamut of Indo-Soviet relations 
the focus is deliberately limited to those major political, 
economic and arms trade interactions which are likely to 
highlight the autonomy and dependence in India's relations 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In 
essence the sub-thesis is a series of case studies strung 
together.
The format is chronological. As a prelude to the main 
thrust Chapter I examines the context in which India and the 
Soviet Union entered into a treaty relationship. Following
The term 'dependence' here implies excessive reliance.
In this sense any country can become dependent on another 
because of concentration of foreign trade, or because of 
reliance for a large proportion of economic assistance or 
arms purchases from a single owner. This use of the term 
should not be confused with the meaning of 'dependence' in 
the 'dependencia' tradition where it is used to describe 
certain characteristics of the economy as a whole and is 
intended to trace certain processes which are causally linked 
with its underdevelopment. For an elaboration of the 
differences in the two usages of the term 'dependence' see 
International Organisation, Special issue on 'Dependence and 
Dependency in the Global System', Winter 1978.
3this, Chapter II analyses Indo-Soviet interactions during 
the South Asian crisis of 19 71. The rest of the period from 
1972 to 1981 is divided into three segments in order to 
coincide with the changes of government in India. Each 
segment constitutes a separate chapter wherein the major 
political, economic and arms trade interactions are examined.
Chapter III covers the period from January 19 72 to 
February 19 77 when the Congress party led by Mrs Gandhi was 
in power. Chapter IV deals with the course of relations 
from March 1977 to December 1979. This was the period when 
first the Janata Party led by Mr Morarji Desai and then a 
breakaway faction of the Janata, the Lok Dal, led by Mr Charan 
Singh, held office. Chapter V covers the period from the 
return to power of Mrs Gandhi in January 19 80 to July 19 81, 
the end of the first decade of the treaty relationship. 
Finally, the trends discerned in the review spreading from 
Chapter II to V are drawn together in the Conclusion to put 
forth an assessment of the autonomy and dependence in India's 
relations with the Soviet Union.
4CHAPTER I
THE CONTEXTS OF THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY
The conclusion of the Indo-Soviet treaty was a watershed 
development in the relations between the two countries. It 
reflected the fact that Indo-Soviet relations had reached a 
level of closeness previously thought highly unlikely in 
New Delhi, probably in Moscow too, and certainly in the 
rest of the world. It is obvious that this proximity did 
not emerge overnight. This chapter attempts to explain the 
factors that facilitated the signing of the treaty by 
charting the contexts in which it was concluded.
Broadly the treaty can be placed in two contexts:
(a) the evolution of Indo-Soviet relations since India's 
independence in 1947; (b) the international (regional as 
well as global) situation in 1971.
I
Evolution of Indo-Soviet Relations: 1947-1971
From 1947 to 1971 Indo-Soviet relations can be said 
to have evolved through four discernible phases. (Although 
such a division runs the risk of over-simplification it does 
serve to map the contours of Indo-Soviet relations.) In 
the Stalinist period from 1947 to 1953 the interactions 
between the two countries were minimal. It was followed by 
the euphoria of the Khrushchev era from 1954 to 1964. 
Relations became extremely friendly. This in turn gave way,
5from the end of 1964, to a significant cooling down of the 
friendship and the development of strains in the relationship. 
However from 1969 onwards there was an upturn in relations 
and by 19 71 a large measure of the former euphoria was 
restored.
(a) 1947-1953
Even though the USSR was one of the few countries with 
which India established diplomatic relations a few months 
prior to gaining independence,^" the relations between the 
two countries did not progress much further during this 
period.
In the Stalinist perception India had not gained genuine 
independence by the transfer of power. According to Soviet 
assessment a superficial political document granting 
independence could not impinge on the reality of continued 
British economic and administrative dominance in India.
Thus India was deemed to be merely enacting an elaborate 
charade. Consequently the domestic policy of the Congress 
government was described as being reactionary and its foreign 
policy was seen as drawing India into the war machinations 
of the Anglo-American bloc in the guise of pursuing a middle 
course. Even when India in pursuance of its non-aligned 
policy adopted stances which were acceptable to the Soviet 
Union - such as on the Korean question, on the issue of the
 ^ A press communique issued on 13 April 194 7 stated that 
India and the USSR had agreed to exchange diplomatic missions 
at the ambassadorial level. See J.A. Naik, Soviet Policy 
Towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev (Vikas, Delhi, 1970), 
p. 30.
6Japanese peace treaty and on the seating of the Peoples
Republic of China at the UN - Soviet commentators interpreted
such stances not in terms of the spontaneous decisions of
the Indian government but as a result of the fact that
'Indian ruling circles are forced to reckon with the Indian
2people's clearly expressed will for peace'.
On the Indian side too, despite its espoused non-alignment 
and Nehru's declaration that the Soviet Union was India's 
neighbour with whom 'we shall have to undertake many common
3tasks and have much to do with each other', there was some 
hesitation to get closer to a state which did not fully 
recognise Indian independence and which Indians suspected 
had close ideological links with the Communist Party of 
India (CPI), whose role in domestic politics was then, to 
say the least, unsavoury.
Towards the end of this period there were signs of 
changes in Soviet attitude. The Kremlin's growing interest 
in India was reflected in Stalin granting an interview to 
the Indian Ambassador, Dr S. Radhakrishnan, in April 1952.
It was the first time that Stalin had met an Indian Ambassador 
since the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the two countries. Moreover, just a few days prior to
2 I. Lemm, 'Fruits of Imperialist Domination in India 
and Pakistan', Voprosy Ekonomiki, No.l, 1953, p.73.
3 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, 
September 1946-April 1961 (Publications Division, New Delhi, 
1961) , p.3.
his death, Stalin met the new Ambassador Mr K.P.S. Menon 
in February 1953. Yet it was only subsequent to Stalin's 
death and the rise of the new leadership that the two 
countries drew significantly closer.
(b) 1954-1964
This period witnessed a remarkable growth in relations.
The new Soviet leadership began reassessing Soviet foreign
policy. As part of this overall process attitudes towards
India underwent a change. The first hint of this change was
provided in Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet on
8 August 1953. He praised India's role in the Korean armistice
and indicated that the process of further strengthening of
4relations between the two countries was underway. In
5December 1953 the first trade agreements was signed; in 
the May Day 1954 slogans of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) India made its frist appearance and was listed 
first among non-communist countries in Soviet greetings.^
While these developments created the necessary atmosphere 
for the growth of Indo-Soviet relations the single most 
important event which drew India and the Soviet Union closer 
towards each other was Pakistan joining the military alliance 
system that was set up along the southern flanks of the 
Soviet Union and China, by the Eisenhower Administration.
To India the notion of a defence alliance to protect 
South East Asia and, shortly after, the Middle East against 
Chinese and Soviet attacks, respectively, was abhorrent on
4 Pravda, August 9, 1953.
5 Naik, opfcit., p.168.
g
G. Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia (Angus and Robertson, 
Sydney, 1973), p.109.
8several counts. Firstly, such an alliance contradicted 
Inida's passionately held view that military blocs generally 
were steps towards war rather than peace. Secondly, the 
inclusion of Pakistan introduced a system of military bios 
into India's immediate neighbourhood, thus converting the 
Indian sub-continent into a theatre of cold war at the very 
time when India was making strenuous efforts to make it 
the centre of a 'peace area'. Thirdly, and probably most 
importantly, the prospect of US military assistance to 
Pakistan threatened to strengthen that country not only in 
relation to the Soviet Union and China with whom it hardly 
had any quarrel, but also in relation to India with whom 
important issues were still outstanding. Therefore despite 
US assurances that military assistance to Pakistan was not 
and would not be directed against India, Nehru expressed 
India's distaste for the whole project.
As a response to this development India adopted a two­
fold strategy. First it devoted a considerable part of its 
diplomatic efforts to bring together all like-minded countries 
with the object of giving definite shape to non-alignment 
as an international force. Second, it sought to improve 
relations with China and the USSR.
The Soviet Union equally disturbed by Western attempts 
to ring its border recognised the importance of having a 
close relationship with India. Thus began a new stage in 
Indo-Soviet relations. The metamorphosis in the Soviet 
attitude towards India was striking. The Congress party 
was transformed from 'a tool of the most reactionary elements
9of the Indian bourgeoisie' to a champion of Indian progress.
In January 1955 Pravda endorsed India's domestic and foreign
. . 7 policies.
Soviet support of India's position on Kashmir, which 
had hitherto been indirect, became explicit. Twice (in 1957 
and 1962) Security Council resolutions unacceptable to 
India were vetoed by the Soviet Union. When Indian troops 
occupied the Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Daman and Dili in 
1961 the Soviet reaction contrasted markedly from that of 
the West. The Western reaction was hostile. A Western 
sponsored motion intended to censure India was introduced 
in the Security Council. On the other hand, the Soviet 
President Brezhnev, then in India, assured Soviet support
gfor the Indian action and the Soviet Union vetoed the 
Western sponsored resolution, effectively putting the lid 
on further international involvement on that issue.
More importantly, when relations between China and India 
deteriorated and led to border clashes in 19 59 the Soviet 
Union adopted a line of neutrality by equating 'fraternal
f 9China'and 'friendly India', but when the Sino-Indian war 
broke out in October 1962 the Soviet Union momentarily 
abandoned its impartiality. In an editorial on 25 October 
1962, Pravda denounced the McMahon line as an imperialist 
creation and approved Chinese cease-fire proposals.
7 ibid., p.Ill.
o ibid., p.121.
9 TASS, September 9, 1959.
10 Pravda, October 25, 1962.
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However, it is now generally recognised that this shift 
in Soviet attitude was dictated by simultaneous events in 
Cuba which forestalled the Soviet Union from'¡unduly 
antagonising China at such a critical juncture. With the 
ending of the Cuban tension the USSR resumed its former 
line of neutrality. This was unprecedented. For the first 
time the Soviet Union had adopted a neutral line in a dispute 
between a communist and a non-communist state, and it was 
widely interpreted as indirect Soviet support for India.
As Sino-Soviet relations worsened the Soviet comment 
on the Sino-Indian border dispute became correspondingly 
more critical of China and was sympathetic to India, thus 
indicating that common perceptions of China added another 
strand to bind Indo-Soviet relations.
While on the one hand the USSR had extended diplomatic 
support to India, on the other it sought to enhance India's 
status in the world. The Soviet press carried articles 
asserting that India had emerged as a great power on the 
international scene and its involvement was essential in 
solving problems not only in Asia but also throughout the 
world.^ That this was more than empty flattery became 
evident in 1958. In the wake of the Lebanon-Jordan crises 
which followed General Kassem's seizure of power in Iraq 
Khrushchev suggested India's inclusion in a proposed summit 
conference at Geneva along with the USSR, USA, Britain and 
12France.
^  See A. Dyakov, 'The Sixth Great Power', New Times, August 8, 
1957 and V. Nikhanin, 'India's Role in World Affairs','' 
International Affairs, January 1958.
12 Arthur Stein, India and the Soviet Union (University of 
Chicago Press, 1969), p.164.
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Economic interactions between India and the USSR was
also enhanced. This was reflected in the growth in trade
turnover and increase in aid to India. While in 1953-54,
the annual trade was Rs.28 million by 1959-60 it had
increased to Rs.750 million and in 1963-64 it stood at
13Rs.1,900 million. From 1954-65 Soviet aid to India amounted
to $1,022 million, which represented 20.3% of Soviet economic
14assistance to developing countries. Admittedly this was 
substantial but US to India aid in the corresponding period 
was much more. It totalled $5,901 m i l l i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s  
the impact of Soviet aid on the Indian economy was considerable 
since it was primarily concentrated on heavy industry in 
the public sector - an area to which Indian decision makers 
had given top priority. The Bhilai steel plant and the 
agreement to build the Bokaro plant (after withdrawal of 
US offer), the Heavy Engineering Corporation at Ranchi, 
the coalmining machinery plant(Durgapur), the Heavy Electrical 
plant (Hardwar) and the oil refineries at Barauni and Koyali 
were some of the most prominent examples of Soviet economic 
assistance in setting up the basic industrial infrastructure. 
Finally from 1960 onwards military assistance was also 
extended to India.
That India was well aware of the advantages of the close 
ties it had forged with the Soviet Union was evident by the 
restraint in Indian responses to Soviet actions that did not 
infringe directly on Indian interests.
13 Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance, 1966-67
14 . L. Tansky, U.S. and U.S.S.R.: Aid to Developing Countries 
(New York, Praeger, 1957), pp.18-19.
12
India did not place the Soviet invasion of Hungary in
1956 on par with the Anglo-French incursion in the Suez,
which occurred at the same time. On the one hand the Anglo-
French intervention was vocally denounced by India in the
UN and elsewhere.^ On the other India declined to support
the General Assembly resolutions which were critical of Soviet
actions and proposed holding elections under UN auspices.
Pandit Nehru himself was careful in expressing views on the
Hungarian situation. While consistently calling for a
withdrawal of foreign troops from Hungary and mildly
criticising some of the Soviet actions, he cleverly neutralised
any adverse effect such criticism might have on the Soviet
Union by referring to the instigations that emanated from
17outside Hungary. The obvious differences in the attitudes 
of non-aligned India exposed Pandit Nehru to severe criticism 
both in India and the West. Undoubtedly the realisation 
that India might need Soviet support in repelling Western 
attempts to get India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir under 
UN supervision. However, considering that the degree of 
Indian political and economic dependence on the Soviet Union 
in 1956 could hardly be termed substantial, reading into 
India's stance on the Hungarian issue the operation of Soviet 
influence on Indian foreign policy would be farfetched.
Again, when the Soviets resumed nuclear testing in 1961, 
on the eve of the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade, the
See The Suez Canal Crisis and India (Information Series 
of India, New Delhi, 1956).
17 Nehru, op.cit., pp.557-562.
13
Indian Prime Minister did not specifically condemn it.
Instead, he expressed in general terms that India was
18opposed to all forms of nuclear testing. But, there are 
no grounds to believe that Mr Nehru's reaction was inhibited 
by fear of incurring Soviet displeasure.
Nonetheless it is true that there was a certain prudence
in Mr Nehru's pronouncements relating to Soviet actions on
issues that did not concern Indian interests which was not
evident in his rebukes to the West on similar issues.
According to a knowledgeable Western commentator,
Nehru's reasons for this were complex.
Although he himself frequently said 
that he could afford to be franker with 
Westerners because of a shared background, 
it is also clear from his writings as far 
back as 1927 that the Soviet Union in his 
eyes 'carried no stain of original sin' 
for Western colonialism in A s i a . 19
This is not to say that India did not openly express 
views different from those of the USSR. On the Congo crisis, 
and the Soviet proposal to replace the UN Secretary General 
by a 'Troika', India adopted stances contrary to those of 
the Soviet Union.
Judging from the sum total of the statements and actions 
of the Indian Prime Minister Mr Nehru it could be said that 
he regarded Soviet friendship as a counterweight to India's 
heavy dependence on the West, and from 19 59 onwards as a 
guarantee against China. In both senses, therefore, India's 
relations with the USSR were seen as defence of non-alignment 
and an essential part of it.
G. Jukes, op.cit., p.120.18
14
(c) 1964-1968
In comparison with the euphoria of the Khrushchev 
era this period witnessed a relative cooling down of Indo- 
Soviet relations. A complement of factors account for this. 
Firstly, since Stalin's death the conduct of Indo-Soviet 
relations at the highest level had depended on continuity 
of contact between Khrushchev and Nehru who shared mutual 
regard for each other. In May 1964 Nehru died and in October 
Khrushchev was deposed. Although the impact of the personalties 
of the two leaders on Indo-Soviet relations need not be 
exaggerated, it is obvious that the new leaders in both 
countries did not share the warmth and regard for 
each other that Nehru and Khrushchev had.
Secondly, in the year following Khrushchev's ouster
Soviet policy towards the Third World underwent significant
changes. The former policy of devoting attention to a
handful of developing Afro-Asian states such as Guinea, Egypt
and India gave way to a new approach. The keynote of this
policy was a more equitable distribution of Soviet favours
over a greater number of developing states, with less attention
20to the internal complexion of the regimes concerned. The 
implications of this general change in Soviet foreign policy, 
as far as the Indian sub-continent was concerned was that 
while India was still considered important it lost its 
position of centrality in Soviet perceptions and the Soviet 
Union began to cultivate closer relations with Pakistan.
20 See generally Ian Clark, Soviet Policy Towards India and 
Pakistan: 1965-1971 (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, ANU, 1974), 
Chapter 2, pp.59-77.
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Another factor specific to the Indian sub-continent
which prompted the Soviet Union to enhance its relationship
with Pakistan was the Soviet desire to broaden its support
base along its southern border so as to counter the trend
of increasing Chinese influence in Pakistan. The latter
too was not averse to a closer relationship with the Soviet Union
It had progressively grown disillusioned with the benefits
accruing from the membership of the Western sponsored alliance
system, especially since Western support for its traditional
rival India had increased in the aftermath of the Sino-
Indian border war of 1962. Thus there was progress in Soviet-
Pakistani relations from 1965 onwards. Although there was
no dramatic change in the relative positions that India
and Pakistan occupied in the order of Soviet priorities it
was clear that the gulf between India and Pakistan in Soviet
estimation was no longer as yawning as it had been only a
few years earlier. The Indo-Pakistani dispute . on the Rann
of Kutch issue and subsequently the Indo-Pakistani war in
September 1965 witnessed the Soviet Union adopting a.neutral
21line between the two countries.
Initially this so-called policy of 'even handedness' 
seemed to be paying dividends as the Soviet Union was 
successful in mediating an Agreement between India and 
Pakistan at Tashkent in 1966. But the Soviet attempt to 
pursue an autonomous policy towards Pakistan coincided with 
the appearance of some stresses and strains in Indo-Soviet 
relations. While most of these strains had their origins
Naik, op.cit., p.137.21
16
in issues which were far removed from Indo-Pakistani and 
Soviet-Pakistani relations, not a few of them took on for 
Indians a special significance beyond their intrinsic 
importance and were exacerbated because of developments in 
Soviet-Pakistani relations.
Briefly, the surface tensions in Indo-Soviet relations 
related to such matters as Soviet 'cartographic aggression' - 
an Indian euphemism for Soviet maps depicting the disputed 
areas of Aksai Chin and Northeastern Frontier Agency as 
belonging to China; the broadcasts of 'Radio Peace and 
Progress' which were portraying the Congress Party and some 
of its leaders in a very unflattering light; the brusque 
criticism by S.A. Skachkov, Chairman of the State Committee 
for Foreign Economic relations,of the managerial inefficiency 
of the Indians in following through on Soviet-aided projects; 
the reluctance of the Soviet Union to carry the burden of 
the devaluation of the Indian rupee in the bilateral trade; 
finally, the Soviet decision to sell military equipment to 
India's arch-rival Pakistan.
While most of the frictions which developed between the 
two countries were insignificant in themselves taken together 
they make this period the most uncomfortable in Indo-Soviet 
relations since the Stalinist era. Although Soviet economic 
and miltiary assistance to India continued, the eventuality 
which the Soviet Union had sought to prevent - that improved 
Soviet-Pakistani relations could only be achieved at the cost 
of Indo-Soviet relations - began to take on reality.
17
(d) 1969-1971
The downward trend evident in the earlier phase of 
Indo-Soviet relations was reversed during this period. The 
primary factor facilitating this upturn in relations was the 
convergence of Soviet and Indian interests due to the 
reinforcement of the shared perception of China as a potential 
threat.
The Ussuri river clashes between the Soviet and Chinese 
border contingents over Damansky (Zhen Bao) island in March 
196 9, heightened tension between China and the Soviet Union. 
Their common 4,500 mile border underwent rapid militarisation. 
The perceived threat from a 'militaristic and aggressive'
China dominated the Soviet foreign policy outlook. The USSR, 
therefore, increasingly felt the need for firm allies responsive 
to the Chinese threat. Whatever influence the Soviets had in 
India was too limited to enable them to include India as such 
an ally. Steadily this need moved the USSR towards closer 
relations with India, since Pakistan's continuing friendly 
relations with China indicated that the Soviet attempt to 
wean it away from China the basis of the 'even handed policy' 
had not proved successful.
On its part India too was responsive to Soviet needs 
since its suspicions of China were significantly heightened 
by Sino-Pakistani road building activities on the borders 
of 'Pakistan-occupied Kashmir' and China. Moreover in July 
1969, there was a new clash on the Sino-Indian border and 
there were reports of Chinese troop concentrations along 
the border with India. Since the US was then in the process 
of disengagement from the Asian mainland it was not possible
18
for India to turn to it for help. Hence India responded
to the Soviet need for a closer relationship between the
two countries. Thus although Mrs Gandhi was eager to deny
that 'New Delhi has increasingly been turning to Moscow'
she nevertheless admitted that 'it is, in fact, Moscow which
22has turned more towards us'.
Concrete evidence of a shift in Soviet policy was 
provided by Soviet efforts to rapidly resolve the problem 
areas in Soviet-Indian relations. The consignment of Soviet 
arms to Pakistan, which was to have been sent in the second 
half of 1969 was stopped. The heat was taken out of the 
debate of 'cartographic aggression' by the Soviet assurance 
that a new map would be published. The Kremlin's extremely 
restrained response to the uproar caused by the Indian 
'discovery', due to an on-site accident, that the Soviets 
had been building an 'unauthorised' cultural centre at 
Trirandrum in the state of Kerala was another example of 
the attempt to minimise as much as possible the embarrassment 
to Mrs Gandhi's government. Finally, the Soviet press comment 
on the direction of India's domestic policy was more favourable 
than it had been in the earlier period.
On the economic front too there were significant changes. 
When S.A. Skachkov, the Chairman of the State Committee for 
Foreign Economic Relations and V.E. Dymshits, First Vice- 
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers visited India in
22 Quoted in Ian Clark, op.cit., p.182.
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February 1970 there was no hint of the severe criticism 
that Skachkov had made of Indian handling of Soviet-aided 
projects. While there was a recognition of problem areas, 
Skachkov and Dymshits on more than one occasion, expressed 
their satisfaction with the progress of the projects and 
explained that many of the difficulties were natural growth 
problems that were not peculiar to India. At the conclusion 
of the visit agreements were signed pledging Soviet help 
for further extension of Bokaro's capacity and Soviet 
assistance in setting up new petrochemical and fertilizer 
plants in India.
In December 1970, the two states signed a new five-year
trade agreement. While at one level it was a continuation
of a long-term trade relationship, on another it also marked
a qualitatively new stage, a 'landmark' in the 'development
23of Indo-Soviet relations'. For the first time the USSR 
agreed to trade such needed items as ships and tankers as 
well as more steel, various metals and new industrial goods. 
More importantly India was to export a larger percentage 
of manufactured goods, including those from Soviet-aided 
projects. This was a development that reflected changes in 
the structure of the Indian economy and would provide 
important markets for India.
The development of extremely close relations between 
India and the Soviet Union by early 1971 was acknowledged 
by Brezhnev in his report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU.
23 R. Remnek, Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy:
A Case Study in Soviet Policy Towards India (Durnham,
N. Carolina Academic Press, 1975), p.97.
20
He declared,
Our friendly relations with India have 
developed considerably. The Indian 
Government's pursuit of a peaceable, 
independent line in international 
affairs and the traditional feelings of 
friendship linking the peoples of the 
two countries have all helped to deepen 
Soviet-Indian cooperation.¿4
The above survey of the broad contours of Indo-Soviet 
relations indicates that in the post-Stalin era the bilateral 
relationship had evolved into one of close cooperation.
After a period of strains during the later part of the 1960s 
Indo-Soviet relaitonshad entered the 1970s on a very positive 
note. In fact the couple of years prior to the signing of 
the treaty were a period of development of increasingly close 
ties and a growing communality of interests between the two 
countries. Thus there was evidence of a bilateral dynamic 
fostering closer cooperation. From this perspective it can 
be argued that the treaty was but another, albeit a major, 
landmark in the broad development of Indo-Soviet relations 
over a period of more than one and a half decades. The 
significance of the treaty can therefore be interpreted as 
providing a legal framework for the existing political, 
economic and cultural relations, developed during the preceding 
fifteen years, and also emphasising that these relations 
would, for the duration of the treaty relationship, develop 
along similar lines. This perspective is not entirely without 
validity. However, such an interpretation does not take 
sufficient account of the timing of the treaty. When the
Pravda, March 31, 1971.24
revealed that it had been under discussion for some two years.
This underlines that 'the needs of the moment must have
2 6clinched the treaty'. The 'bilateral argument' does not 
adequately explain the 'needs of the moment'. In order to 
shed light on this aspect the treaty needs to be placed in 
the context of the regional and global situation in 1971.
II
The International Situation in 1971 
The principal development at the regional level on the 
Indian subcontinent in 1971 was the eruption of the long 
simmering differences between the eastern and western wings 
of Pakistan into a civil war in the eastern wing as a 
consequence of the military crackdown on 25 March 1971.
Given the deep mistrust that exists between the physically 
contiguous yet psychologically distant neighbours, India 
and Pakistan, much of their foreign policies were shaped 
as responses to each other's actions. Therefore, the political 
crisis in East Pakistan progressively sucked India into 
its vortex.
The influx of 7-10 million refugees who fled into India 
from East Pakistan, in order to escape the reign of terror 
of the West Pakistani army, created new economic, social and
25 New Delhi Radio, August 9, 1971, cited in Ian Clark, op.cit., 
p.211.
2 6 The Times (London), August 10, 1971.
the treaty was placed before the Indian Parliament it was
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political problems of massive proportions for the already
beleaguered government of India. The events in East Pakistan
became the overriding issue in India's internal politics.
Many among the Indian elites viewed the crisis as an opportunity
to undo the 'unnatural' balance of power in the subcontinent,
and to cut Pakistan down to a size at which it could no
longer vie to be an equal with India or remain an enemy to
be afraid of. As a knowledgeable Indian commentator, whose
views summed up the feelings most observers, put it,
Opinion makers in India built up systematic 
pressure on the government to act on behalf 
of the BanglaDesh movement. No government 
could have survived in New Delhi if it had 
taken a neutral, hands-off attitude to the 
political upheaval in East Pakistan.27
As the crisis in East Pakistan continued there were
several indicators that India was well on the way to committing
itself to the formation of Bangladesh as an independent entity.
First, on March 31, the Indian Parliament passed a resolution
which condemned 'the massive attack by armed forces from
West Pakistan ... unleashed against the entire people of
2 8East Bengal ...' and assured 'the 75 million people of
East Bengal . . . the wholehearted sympathy and support of
29the people of India'. Thus already at this early stage 
East Pakistan was being referred to as East Bengal, the 
precursor of Bangladesh, and India was overtly sympathetic 
and supportive of the aspirations of the people of East
27 Bhabhani Sengupta, 'South Asia and the Great Powers' in 
W.E. Griffith (ed), The World and the Great Power Triangles 
(MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p.187.
2 8 Lok Sabha Debates (Fifth Series), March 31, 1971, Vol.I,
No.10, Cls.115.
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Pakistan. Second, given the nature of Indo-Pakistani
animosities the very fact that the Government of India after
deliberation decided not to close the borders but to allow
the refugees to come in is indicative of (in a sense) 'the
commitment of the government of India to the liberation of 
30BanglaDesh'. Third, the provisional 'government' of 
Bangladesh was permitted to be set up on Indian soil, and 
although India did not accord it 'de jure' recognition it
gave the 'government' the hospitality it needed to function
31 . .as such. Fourth, the partisans of the Bangladesh Liberation
Army (Mukti Bahini) were allowed sanctuary in India for
regrouping and were permitted to operate from the Indian
side of the border. Moreover from April-May onwards the
Indian armed forces and paramilitary personnel actively
32trained the new recruits of the Mukti Bahini.
The Soviet Union's response to the events in East 
Pakistan differed significantly from that of India. The 
avoidance of war in the subcontinent was something that 
the USSR had worked for at least since the Tashkent agreement 
of 1966. The Soviet line of thinking was that an Indo-Pakistani 
conflict would redound to China's benefit since it would 
increase Chinese influence in Pakistan, whereas if India and 
Pakistan instead of expending their energies in quarrelling 
between themselves, could move towards closer cooperation,
30 M. Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War (S. Chand 
and Co., New Delhi, 1972), p.156.
31 Sengupta, op.cit., p.219.
32 ibid, p.218.
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then the scope for increase in Chinese influence would be
limited and therefore the security of the southeastern flank
of the Soviet Union would be markedly heightened.
Faced with a situation of deteriorating Indo-Pakistani
relations in the wake of the events in East Pakistan the
Soviet Union pursued a policy that would lessen, if not
remove, the crisis before it worsened. On 2 April, the
Soviet President Podgorny wrote to Pakistan's President,
General Yahya Khan, outlining the Soviet position. In the
letter he warned that 'continuation of repressive measures
and bloodshed in East Pakistan will, undoubtedly, only make
the solution of problems more difficult and may do great
harm to the vital interests of the entire people of Pakistan
and therefore advised 'turning to methods of a peaceful 
34settlement' so as to 'meet the interests of the entire
people of Pakistan and the interests of preserving peace in 
35the area'. Thus while the USSR made it clear that it was 
opposed to the use of force to settle the crisis the use 
of the diplomatically correct East Pakistan (in contrast 
to East Bengal used in the Indian Parliament's resolution 
of 31 March) and the emphasis on 'entire people of Pakistan' 
(mentioned twice) in the message revealed that the USSR had 
no interest whatsoever in the breakup of Pakistan. The 
reference to 'peace in the area' indicated the Soviet desire 
to stave off war in the subcontinent.
,33
33 Text reproduced in Soviet Review (New Delhi), January 18, 
1972, p.p.8-9.
34 .. ibid.
35 .. ibid.
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When President Tahya Khan maintained a hard line position
in response to the Soviet appeal, instead of escalating
tension with Pakistan the USSR switched to restraining India.
Although within India pressures intensified rapidly to
adopt policies regarding the flood of refugees into the
country, it was not until May that Pravda even mentioned
the problem. Moreover, during the close consultations
between Soviet and Indian officials the thrust of the Soviet
message to New Delhi was to urge circumspection on India
and to suggest that India should not be the first nation
3 6to recognise the independence of East Pakistan.
At this stage a new element was introduced into the 
situation in South Asia. In July it was revealed that Henry 
Kissinger while on a visit to Pakistan had made a secret 
journey to Peking (arranged through the good offices of 
Pakistan) marking the biggest diplomatic breakthrough of 
our times. It was also announced that Nixon would be 
visiting China in 1972. These developments indicated that 
there was underway a major restructuring of great power 
relations.
Since Pakistan had been actively aiding the rapprochement 
the Indians perceived that the new Sino-US linkage could 
work in South Asia only to the detriment of India. In the 
Indian assessment the development was seen as an instance 
of Pakistan coordinating its policies with China and USA
3 6 R.H. Donaldson, The Soviet Indian Alignment: Quest for 
Influence (Monograph series in World Affairs, Vol.16, 
University of Denver), p.141.
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while India stood isolated. The Indian desire to secure 
Soviet support so as to end India's isolation and counter 
the perceived Pakistan-China-US axis was indeed great.
The Soviet Union was also concerned over the prospect 
of Sino-American rapprochement. It saw in the Indian need 
an opportunity not only to gain influence in New Delhi, 
so as to serve its own global strategic purposes of countering 
the Sino-US alignment, but also to stave off war in South 
Asia so as not to provide China with greater scope to increase 
its influence in Pakistan.
The needs of both the sides were sought to be served 
by the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971. 
From the Indian point of view the Treaty ended India's 
isolation and ensured Soviet support in the face of the 
perceived Pakistan-China-US axis, and also placed additional 
pressure on President Yahya Khan to reach a political solution 
in East Pakistan. From the Soviet viewpoint the Treaty 
was geared to formalising and extending Soviet influence in 
India, not only as a long term counter to the Sino-US accord 
but also for the immediate end of stabilising the situation 
in South Asia, both by deterring the Pakistanis and their 
supporters from adopting aggressive military postures and 
by providing a psychological crutch to the Indians designed 
to forestall an emotional drift towards war.
In conclusion, if an explanation is to be provided for 
India and the Soviet Union entering into a treaty relationship 
there are strong grounds for arguing that it is best cast 
in terms of a combination of both the bilateral as well as
27
the situational dimensions. While the existence of a 
bilateral dynamic in Indo-Soviet relations was an essential 
prerequisite it was by no means sufficient by itself to 
consolidate the Indo-Soviet relationship in 1971. It was 
the 'situational logic' that clinched the issue and cemented 
the Indo-Soviet relationship with a twenty year Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on 9 August 1971.
Ill
The treaty consists of a preamble, which focusses
on Indo-Soviet friendship and the need for world peace,
37and twelve articles.
Article One declares enduring friendship, respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference 
in internal affairs in relations between the two states. 
Articles Two and Three emphasise the support of both the 
parties for general and complete disarmament and their 
opposition to colonialism and racialism in all forms.
Though these are mentioned in general terms it needs to 
be noted that the Soviets had been accusing the Chinese 
of 'racialism' from the days of the Sino-Soviet split and 
the Indian government was accusing the West Pakistan military 
regime of pursuing policies of colonialism and racial 
domination in East Bengal. By implication these articles 
criticise China and Pakistan.
Article Four confirms Soviet respect for India's policy 
of non-alignment' and also expresses India's respect for
Text of Treaty reproduced m  Appendix.37
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the USSR's 'peace-loving policy'. Articles Five to Seven 
deal with the maintenance of regular contacts and economic, 
technical, scientific, cultural and other kinds of cooperation 
between the two countries.
Articles Eight to Ten are explicitly concerned with 
the security aspects of the relationship. Article Eight 
expresses the undertaking of the two 'High Contracting Parties' 
not to enter into or participate in any military alliance 
directed against the other Party. The first part of Article 
Nine goes a step further and states that each side would 
'abstain from giving any assistance to any third party that 
engages in armed conflict with the other Party'. The second 
part guarantees that if either of the Parties is attacked 
or threatened with attack then India and the Soviet Union 
'shall immediately enter into mutual consultations with 
a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate 
effective measures to ensure peace and security for their 
countries'.
Article Ten reinforces this mutual commitment. The 
message of the security aspect of the Treaty was clearly 
Soviet support for India.
Finally, Article Eleven stipulates that the duration of 
the treaty was initially for a twenty year period, while 
Article Twelve stipulates that any differences in the 
interpretation would be settled bilaterally.
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CHAPTER II 
USSR, INDIA AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH
The primary concern of India and the Soviet Union after 
they entered a new era in their relations was the turmoil 
in East Pakistan. This chapter surveys Indian and Soviet 
attitudes on this issue, subsequent to their entering into 
a treaty relationship, in order to assess whether the Soviet 
Union was able to utilize this closer relationship to influence 
Indian foreign policy in the South Asian crisis of 1971.
(a) August 9-0ctober 15
While the treaty symbolised a closer Indo-Soviet
relationship in the face of a perceived Sino-US-Pakistan
axis in South Asia, differences between India and the Soviet
Union over the events in East Pakistan remained. The
Joint Statement issued on August 12, at the end of the talks
which had led to the Treaty bears testimony to that. The
Communique did not refer to East Pakistan as East Bengal,
though this was what India desired, and was the term the
Indian Parliament had used in its resolution of March 31.^
Furthermore, the Indian foreign minister was described as
having explained to his Soviet counterpart the burden the
2refugees were placing on India, but there was no mention 
of what the Soviets felt about this. Apparently the Soviet
30
Union did not as yet appreciate the problems created for
India, and therefore did not share India's perception of
the imminent need to take action against Pakistan so as to
alleviate the refugee crisis.
Additionally, the Joint Statement carried a non-use
3of force declaration. It is possible that this had been 
prompted by Soviet concern that India might use force to 
solve the Bangladesh crisis. Alternatively it could have 
been a reflection of India's concern about Chinese intentions. 
Given the situation then prevalent it is very likely that 
the Soviet concern vis-a-vis India was the predominant 
factor accounting for the insertion of the clause about 
peaceful solutions. For, despite its verbosity since 1965, 
China had actually acted with restraint towards India and 
in fact in 1970 the requirements of normalisation were 
discussed between Indian and Chinese diplomats in various 
capitals.*
Despite the continued differences in the attitudes
of the two countries, in September at the United Nations
the Soviet Union consistently blocked Pakistan's attempts
. . 5to obtain UN intervention m  the crisis. That this did
3 ibid.
4 . . . .Bhabhani Sengupta, Soviet-Asian Relations m  the 1970s and
Beyond: An Interpreceptional Study (New York, Praeger, 1976) ,
p.152.
5 . . .R. Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh (Chatto & Windus, IISS, 1975), p.83.
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not mark a coincidence of Indian and Soviet views was 
evident when amidst mounting pressure in India to act 
decisively, Mrs Gandhi visited Moscow in late September.
According to an India analyst, 'the Russians were 
tireless in trying to persuade Mrs Gandhi out of any 
intention to intervene militarily'.^ The Soviet Prime 
Minister Kosygin reportedly advised Mrs Gandhi that the 
conflict in East Pakistan was an internal problem of Pakistan
and it was for the people of Pakistan to decide what sort
. . . 7of political security they should have. Speaking to
Indian correspondents at the time of Mrs Gandhi's departure
Kosygin made it clear that the Soviet Union was firmly
opposed to India going to war with Pakistan, even after all
efforts to find a peaceful solution had failed. In fact
he reportedly invoked the principle of non-intervention to
gjustify the Soviet point of view.
On her part, despite Soviet pressure, Mrs Gandhi held
that
the government of India is determined to 
take all necessary measures to stop the 
inflow of refugees from East Bengal to 
India and to ensure that those refugees 
who are already in India return to their 
homeland without delay.9
 ^ Pran Chopra, India's Second Liberation (Cambridge, Mass., 
MIT Press 1974), p.90.
7 Times of India, September 30, 1971.
g Girilal Jain, 'Divergent Approaches to Bangladesh',
Times of India, October 6, 1971.
 ^ Foreign Affairs Record (Ministry of External Affairs,
Govt, of India), September 1971, Vol.XVII, No.9, pp.187-190.
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On the issue of whether the events in East Pakistan were
an internal matter of Pakistan, Mrs Gandhi stated
What has happened in East Bengal - 
or Bangladesh, as the world has 
begun to call it - can no longer 
be regarded as Pakistan's domestic 
affair.10
The differences between the Indian and Soviet perceptions
were manifested dramatically by the contrast between the
Indian and Soviet versions of the Joint Declaration issued
at the culmination of the visit. While the Indian version
referred throughout to 'East Bengal' ^  the Soviet version
12spoke only of 'East Pakistan'.
Although in the aftermath of Mrs Gandhi's visit there
was a marked increase in the hostility of Soviet press
reports on Pakistan's policies, yet there were limits on
how far the Soviets went at this stage. As one commentator
noted, 'the major thrust of the Soviet press commentary was
13still on the need to avoid war on the subcontinent'. That
the Soviets were still attempting to restrain India from
taking actions which might lead to war was made clear by
the Soviet President Podgorny. When he stopped over at New
Delhi on October 1, on his way to Hanoi, Podgorny declared,
'We consider that the further sliding towards a military
14conflict must be prevented'. If there was any doubt on
ibid., p .191.
11 ibid., pp.187-190.
12 Pravda, September 30, 1971.
13 R.H. Donaldson, 'India: The Soviet Stake in Stability', 
Asian Survey, June 1972, Vol.XII, No.6, p.485.
14 Pravda, October 2, 1971.
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this point it was removed by the reference in the Soviet-
Algerian communique issued at the conclusion of Kosygin's
visit to Algeria in early October that both parties affirm
their 'respect for the national unity and integrity of
15Pakistan'.
The Soviet diplomatic pressure on India brought about
the first shift in India's stance on Bangladesh. On October 8
the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh publicly acknowledged
that India did not regard sovereign independence as
necessarily the only solution to the Bangladesh problem.
Addressing the All India Congress Committee, the policy
making caucus of the Congress party at New Delhi, he stated
that a political solution even within the framework of a
united Pakistan was acceptable to India, provided it was
16approved by the elected representatives of East Bengal.
It appeared that the Soviet Union had succeeded in exerting 
influence on India to modify its stance.
The shift however proved only momentary. As the monsoons 
ended in October,tension between India and Pakistan rose 
sharply. Pakistan with US assistance was making progress
17m  weaning away a faction of the Awami League leadership.
In a televised broadcast on October 12, General Yahya Khan
18spoke of all out war and on the pretext of military exercises
^  ibid., October 9, 1971.
R. Jackson, op.cit., p.86 and Bhabhani Sengupta, 'South Asia 
the Great Powers' in W.E. Griffith (ed), The World and the 
Great Power Triangles (MIT Press, Mass., 1973), p.229.
17 . . . . .The Anderson Papers on U.S. Handling of Situation m  Indian
Sub-continent (New Delhi, December 1971), pp.119-120.
18 Bhabhani Sengupta (1973), op.cit., p.229.
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Pakistani troops were moved towards the Indian border, in
19both East and West Pakistan.
The Indian policy reaction was swift. High level
discussions were held in New Delhi. The Indians seized
the opportunity that Pakistani actions provided them to escape
from the position they had adopted under Soviet pressure.
On October 14, Mrs Gandhi announced that Swaran Singh had
been misquoted and that India saw independence as the only
20way out of the crisis in East Bengal. Since the logical 
extension of this line would be Indian recognition which 
in turn could possibly result in an Indo-Pakistani war,
Mrs Gandhi seemed to be indicating that if need be India 
was willing to 'go it alone', irrespective of Soviet support.
(b) October 16-December 16
The Soviet Union was faced with a discouraging yet 
clarified situation. India was not keen to compromise, 
and the Soviet Union realised that its attempt to restrain 
India had been unsuccessful. Therefore the Soviets evidently 
concluded that, given the circumstances, their interests 
would be best served by bowing to Indian objectives. On 
October 22, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin 
arrived in India for talks which were labelled as in 
accordance with the obligation for 'consultation' with a
19 R. Jackson, op.cit., p.88.
20 Times of India, October 15, 1971.
35
view to 'eliminating an attack or threat of attack'
specified in Article Nine of the treaty. Moreover, for
the first time since the beginning of the crisis both
sides were stated to have 'agreed completely in their
21assessment of the situation'. A further display of change 
in the Soviet attitude was provided by the arrival in India 
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet airforce, Marshal
Kutakhov. The fact that Pakistan refused overflight
. . . . 2 2  facilities to him underscores the importance of the trip
to Indo-Soviet interactions on the Bangladesh issue.
In November there were no official Soviet pronouncements
indicating the close convergence of the Indian and Soviet
positons on the South Asian crisis. The tenor of Soviet
press comment however became overtly critical of Pakistan's
policy and expressive and demonstrative in its support of
the liberation forces in Bangladesh.
When war broke out between India and Pakistan on
December 3, the Soviet Union moved along several lines to
translate its support into demonstrative action on behalf
of its treaty partner. On December 5, TASS issued a
23statement branding Pakistan as the aggressor. When the 
UN Security Council discussed the matter the Soviet Ambassador 
vetoed ceasefire resolutions three times (on December 5, 6 and 
13) while India completed its military operations in Bangladesh.
Pravda, October 28, 1971.
22 Times of India, October 31, 1971.
23 B.B.C. Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter referred 
to as SWB) , December 6, 1971, SU/3857/A3/1.
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On the military front the Soviet Union reportedly assured 
India that in case of a Chinese attack across the Himalayas,
the Soviet Union would start diversionary action in Sinkiang. 
Finally when the US despatched a task force of the Seventh 
Fleet into the Bay of Bengal as a show of force, the Soviet 
Ambassador Pegor informed the Indian government that the
25Soviet Union would not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene. 
Three days after the US task force sailed towards the Bay 
of Bengal through the Straits of Malacca vessels of the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet followed suit. In short the Soviet Union 
held the international ring while India solved the Bangladesh 
problem to its own satisfaction.
From the point of view of the central question that 
this chapter addresses, that is whether the Soviet Union was 
able to influence India's foreign policy posture in the wake 
of the new relationship, the above survey provides interesting 
revelations.
The treaty in August did not represent any change in 
the attitudes of India and the Soviet Union towards the 
Bangladesh crisis. Probably differences in strategic objectives 
kept the two from complete agreement, and each sought to
24 Jack Anderson's article in Daily Telegraph, January 10, 1972 
reproduced in R. Jackson, op-cit., p.231. Interestingly 
during the UN debate on the Indo-Pakistan war the Chinese 
delegate pointedly asked the Soviet representative for a 
categorical assurance that there would be no intervention in 
Sinkiang should China move in support of Pakistan. No such 
Soviet assurance was forthcoming. On this see Bhabhani 
Sengupta (1973), op.cit., p.231.
Anderson, op.cit.
24
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influence the other. As a perceptive Indian scholar
commenting on the treaty noted:
the two entered into a coalition-type 
of relationship in which collaboration 
for the attainment of shared objectives 
did not preclude efforts by each to 
influence the other for the pursuit of 
its own strategic interests.26
Until mid-October the Soviet Union prevailed in preventing 
India from taking further action that would lead to war and 
momentarily even succeeded in influencing India to change 
its posture. But the working out of historic local antagonisms 
proved too strong a force for Soviet diplomacy to arrest. 
Therefore commencing with Firyubin's October 22 visit Soviet 
policy became supportive of India, and the latter used the 
Soviet connection to its advantage. This is not to imply that 
India influenced the Soviet Union. For, if perceptions of 
interests are identical, one side cannot be said to be 
exercising influence over the other.
26 Bhabhani Sengupta, 'The Soviet Union and South Asia', 
in Roger Kanet (ed), The Soviet Union and the Developing 
Countries (Baltimore, John Hopkins, 1974) , p.132.
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CHAPTER III 
'HEY DAY* OF INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS
In the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani war the stage 
seemed set for further consolidation of Indo-Soviet 
cooperation. Soviet prestige in India was greater than 
ever before. Since Soviet support had played a key role in 
the Indian victory India was politically beholden to the 
Soviet Union. Moreover the Soviet Union had demonstrated 
its value as an ally and this had resulted in a broadening 
of support within India for closer ties with it. This chapter 
assesses whether this greater Soviet prestige resulted in 
India moving closer to the Soviet Union politically, 
economically and in the sphere of arms trade, during the 
period from 1972 to early 1977, while Mrs Gandhi's Congress 
party was in office.
I
The immediate postwar period witnessed a glorification of 
Indo-Soviet friendship in terms mere mortals would generally 
believe to be reserved for the other world. Official 
commentaries sang praise of the 'brotherly love', 'mutuality' 
and 'cooperation' existing between India and the Soviet Union. 
Joint Declarations stressed the cordiality of Indo-Soviet 
relations, and emphasised the 'profound' and 'deep' satisfaction 
of the two states regarding their relationship.
Below this surface of cordiality ran the current of an 
intensified Indian desire not to get burdened with Soviet
35
friendship. The most emphatic indication of this desire
was provided by Mrs Gandhi during an interview with
C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times in January 1972.
Replying to a question regarding India's relations with the
Soviet Union in the light of the USSR's strong political
and military support in the war Mrs Gandhi stated,
Countries help one another because 
they need one another. Obviously 
countries are not disinterested 
when they help one another.^
She further added 'We are unable to display gratitude in
2any tangible sense for anything'.
Whether this line of thinking was translated into 
policy action or was a mere rhetorical flourish is the theme 
to be examined in this section by analysing Indian and Soviet 
attitudes on major international issues.
(a) Indian Ocean: 'Zone of Peace' and Super Power Rivalry 
Amongst the major issues on the international agenda 
in the early 1970s was the question of super power rivalry 
in the Indian Ocean. Since the minimisation of external 
influence in the Indian Ocean region would enhance the 
potential for India exercising its own influence in the 
region India had from the late 1960s onwards constantly 
protested against militarisation of the Indian Ocean by 
external powers. It had characterised super power presence
1 New York Times, February 17, 1972.
2 ibid.
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in the Indian Ocean as the re-emergence of gunboat diplomacy 
and a threat to the security of the littoral. It was one 
of the principal advocates of the campaign to exclude 
external military presence by declaring the Indian Ocean 
as a Zone of Peace.
All along the Soviet Union had objected to the move 
to declare the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace on the grounds 
that any attempt to prevent a Soviet military presence in 
the Ocean would be an infringement of the right of free
3navigation on the high seas. The Soviet stand was that 
it would be willing to support the 'Zone of Peace' proposal 
provided it was in consonance with 'international law'.
In effect this meant that the USSR's right to send its navy 
into the Indian Ocean whenever and wherever it chooses to 
do so should be accepted.
On December 16, 1971 the United Nations General Assembly 
voted on the resolution declaring the Indian Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace. The resolution called upon the great powers to 
halt 'the further escalation and expansion of their military 
bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities' 
as well as any manifestation 'of great power military presence...
4conceived in the context of great power rivalry'. The 
differing strategic perceptions of India and the Soviet Union 
were reflected in their votes on the resolution.
3 Ian Clark, 'Autonomy and Dependence in Recent Indo-Soviet 
Relations', Australian Outlook, April 1977, p.161.
4 . .Text of UN Resolution 28 32 is reproduced m  Dieter Braun,
Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or Zone of Peace? (Croom 
Helm, Canberra, 1983), pp.214-215.
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India, along with a majority of UN members voted 
in favour of the resolution. The Soviet Union abstained.
Since then every year there have been regular UN votes on 
the implementation of the Zone of Peace resolution. The 
differing voting patterns of India and the Soviet Union 
have continued and are testimony of Indian unwillingness 
to move closer to the USSR.
A further demonstration of Indian reluctance to 
subordinate its interests to those of the Soviet Union is 
provided on the question of bases. Time and again there 
have been reports in the Western media about India granting 
special base facilities to the Soviet Union. There is no 
evidence to substantiate such contentions. The Indian 
government has denied all such reports every time it has
5been asked about them in the Indian Parliament.
However, in a smaller way India did make concessions 
to Soviet sensibilities. A distinction was drawn in Indian 
public pronouncements between Soviet and US activities in 
the Indian Ocean. According to the Indians the Soviets 
had a naval presence whereas the US had a naval base,^ and
7therefore the latter was more objectionable than the former.
5 For example on December 5, 1974 the Indian defence minister 
categorically stated, 'No special facilities are being provided 
to ships from the Soviet Union in Indian ports', Lok Sabha 
Debates (Fifth Series), December 5, 1974, Vol.XLVI, No.16,
Cls.159-160 (transcript translated from Hindi). 
g
Deputy External Affairs Minister: 'I can only say that a 
military base is certainly different from a naval presence',
Lok Sabha Debates (Fifth Series), December 12, 1974, Vol.XLVI, 
No.21, Cl.3.
7 In an interview Mrs Gandhi stated that while the establishment 
of a strategic base by the US on Diego Garcia added tensions 
Russian ships were just passing by and that was quite a 
different situation, Times of India, January 28, 1975.
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Based on such reasoning Indian criticism focussed on US 
operations in the Indian Ocean while at the same time Indian
greferences to Soviet operations were subdued. An American
analyst in a particularly critical assessment of India's
attitudes towards the super powers observed,
India excused, justified or ignored 
the naval power of the Soviet Union, 
but the U.S. navy and, more 
particularly, its base at Diego Garcia 
became the government's special 
scapegoat.9
While such an assessment may be too harsh, the point 
that India was more tolerant of Soviet activities than it 
was of US operations is a valid one. Further evidence of 
Indian deference to Soviet sensibilities was provided 
during Mrs Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union in June 1976.
The Indian Prime Minister reiterated the distinction India 
had drawn between US and Soviet activities. Furthermore 
the Joint Declaration released at the end of Mrs Gandhi's 
visit stated that the two sides recognised that the 
establishment of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would 
have to be in conformity with 'generally recognised principles 
of international law'.^ This was a formulation that the
g Mr Swaran Singh's speech on the Indian Ocean in the Lok Sabha 
on November 12, 197 3 was a typical example of imbalance in 
Indian attitudes towards US and USSR operations in the region. 
See Lok Sabha Debates (Fifth Series), November 12, 1973,
Vol.XXXII, No.1, Cls.252-254.
9 Joel Larus, 'India's Non Alignment and Superpower Rivalry 
in the Indian Ocean' in Clark and Bowman (eds), The Indian Ocean 
in Global Politics (Westview Press, 1981), p.49.
^  Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter referred as FEER),
June 25, 1976, p.14.
^  Pravda, June 14, 1976.
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Soviets had long been using to defend their naval activities 
and to rebut calls for ending their presence in the Indian 
Ocean. Indian acceptance of this phrase revealed that India 
recognised the validity of Soviet objections.
The record thus indicates that while refusing to 
radically alter its stance on the Zone of Peace issue India 
did make concessions to Soviet sensibilities.
(b) Nuclear Proliferation
Two aspects of the nuclear proliferation problem which
impinged on Indo-Soviet relations were the attitudes towards
the Non Proliferation Treaty and towards the creation of a
nuclear free zone in South Asia.
In the negotiations leading to the signing of the Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1969 the positions adopted by
the two countries were diametrically opposite. The Soviet
Union was amongst the most ardent advocates of universal
adherence to the NPT. India, on the other hand, despite
12Soviet pressure, refused to support it on the grounds 
that it contained an imbalance of obligations weighted 
against non-nuclear states.^3
The closer relations that came into being between India 
and the Soviet Union after 1971 did not bring about any change
12 See D. Rothermund, 'India and the Soviet Union', The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 
November 1969, p.87.
13 . . . .For a detailed statement of Indian objections to the NPT
see UN Document No.A/C.1,DV.1567.
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in their respective policies. The Indian nuclear explosion, 
albeit a 'peaceful1 one, on 18 May 1974, highlighted the 
potential divergence of interests of the two countries.
The declarations made by the representatives of the two 
countries in the months following the Indian explosion 
testify to this.
On the one hand, Mr Brezhnev declared, 'The task of the
more effective and universal application of the treaty on
Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is becoming more urgent
14than ever before'. On the other hand, Mr Brajesh Mishra,
the Indian representative at the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament asserted,
We have considered and we continue to 
consider that the NPT is not an equal 
legal instrument. It is a discriminatory 
instrument and I must categorically 
state here that we will not become a 
party to that instrument as long as the 
discriminatory character of that 
instrument remains as it is today.
Thus India maintained its longheld reservations about 
the NPT while its ally lost no opportunity to stress the 
need for universal adherence to the NPT. What is more 
interesting is that notwithstanding this conspicuous divergence 
between the positions of the two countries the Indian nuclear 
explosion evoked no censure from the USSR. In fact as the 
annual publication of the International Institute for Strategic
^  Pravda, July 22, 1974.
Foreign Affairs Record, July 1974, p.217.15
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Studies, the Strategic Survey noted, 'the Soviet Union, far
from condemning the Indian explosion, seemed to endorse it'.
Given the wellknown Soviet commitment to the NPT one cannot
but agree with the assessment that it represented 'a very
17real Soviet concession to India'.
As a consequence of the Indian explosion the proposal 
to declare South Asia as a Nuclear Free Zone became an 
important issue. The Soviet attitude towards nuclear free 
zones was a logical extension of its position on non­
proliferation. Since it was wedded to non-proliferation 
the USSR generally also supported nuclear free zones. On 
the basis of the general Soviet attitude towards such matters 
one can assume that it would have been consistent for the 
USSR to support moves for declaring South Asia as a nuclear 
free zone. Yet in the specific case of South Asia the 
Soviet Union did not lend its support.
In October 1974 when Pakistan's President Bhutto visited 
the Soviet Union he made a strong plea for the declaration 
of South Asia as a nuclear free zone, emphasising the positive
contribution such a step would make to the goal of non-
18proliferation. Although this line of reasoning resembled 
that of the Soviet Union generally, the Soviet Union refused
to be drawn. The Joint communique at the end of Bhutto's
. . . . 19visit was silent on the question.
^  Strategic Survey (IISS, London, 1974), p.42 quoted in 
Ian Clark, op.cit., p.161.
17 ibid.
18 For text of Bhutto's specch see Foreign Affairs Pakistan, 
October 1974.
^  Pravda, October 27, 1974.
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In November 1974, both Pakistan and India tabled
resolutions on this question in the UN General Assembly.
The Pakistani proposal called upon all countries in South
Asia to relinquish the testing, use, manufacture, production,
acquisition or storage of any nuclear weapons or nuclear
20launching devices. The proposal got the backing of the
UN Secretary General who felt it was necessary in connection
with universal disarmament efforts. The Soviet Union did
not support it.
On the other hand the draft put forward by India
spoke of a denuclearised zone in South Asia 'taking into
21account its special features and geographical extent'.
From the Indian point of view amongst the 'special features'
22were some which made the very idea a non-starter. In 
fact the Indian draft precluded any further discussion of 
a South Asian nuclear free zone in international fora. 
Nevertheless the Soviet Union supported it.
The Soviet action of supporting the toothless Indian 
resolution and not the tougher Pakistani one was not in 
consonance with the general Soviet attitude on such matters. 
It makes sense only as an instance of Soviet deference to 
Indian reservations.
20 D. Braun, op.cit., p.188.
21 Quoted m  Ian Clark, op„cit,, p.161.
22 The Indian representative to the UN Committee on 
Disarmament listed out several factors which 'make the 
situation inappropriate for the establishment of a nuclear 
weapon free zone in the sub region of South Asia', Foreign 
Affairs Record, November 1975, p.297.
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(c) Asian Collective Security
In the two issues examined so far the stakes involved 
for India were high. Consequently it would have been 
difficult for the Soviet Union to influence India to shift 
its posture. Conversely India would have found itself hard 
pressed to justify such a shift. On the issue of Asian 
Collective Security what was at stake was merely a statement 
endorsing the Soviet security model for Asia. Thus one can 
assume that it would have been easier for the Soviet Union 
to get India to endorse it.
Brezhnev had first floated the idea of Asian Collective
23Security in the context of acute Sino-Soviet rivalry m  1969. 
However the responses of Asian states, including India, were 
negative or at best lukewarm. This resulted in the issue 
being confined to the backburner.
By 1972 the situation in Asia had changed vastly in 
favour of the Soviet Union. The Soviets had signed treaties 
of Friendship and Cooperation with Egypt and Iraq in West 
Asia and India in South Asia. The use of Soviet good offices 
had, at least partly, contributed to the opening of the 
Paris peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam, 
thus conferring on Moscow the coveted role of a peacemaker 
in South-East Asia. It was in this context that Soviet talk
23 For an analysis of the anti-Chinese parentage of the 
proposal see G. Jukes and Ian Clark, 'The Soviets and Asian 
Collective Security: 1969-74' in R. Kanet and D. Bahry (eds), 
Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing 
World (New York, Praeger, 1975), pp.139-155.
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of Asian Collective Security was vigorously renewed. Every
head of government or foreign minister coming in contact with
Soviet leaders was pressed to subscribe to the Soviet proposal
for Asian Collective Security.
When Brezhnev visited India in December 1973 a major goal
24of his was to gain Indian endorsement of the Soviet scheme. 
Judging from the contents of the communique released at the 
end of Mr Brezhnev's visit his efforts were not successful.
The term Asian Collective Security did not find any mention
25 . . .at all. The proposition which had enough merit to warrant
2 6Iranian support was not endorsed by the Indians.
This amounted to a striking display of India's 
determination to maintain its distance from the Soviet Union. 
Probably the Indians wanting to keep their option of a better 
relationship with China openly refrained from endorsing the 
Collective Security scheme.
The Soviets did not give up their efforts to enlist 
Indian support. At the 19 76 Conference on Security and
24 Although no agenda was made public most newspaper reports 
emphasised that Asian Collective Security would be a major 
issue. For example, see Michael Hornsby, 'Mr Brezhnev wooing 
the Indians', The Times, November 26, 19 73; H. Smith, 
'Brezhnev to Seek Backing in India', New York Times,
November 25, 1973; Dilip Mukherjee, 'Mr Brezhnev's Coming 
Visit', Times of India, November 26, 1973.
25 Pravda, November 30, 1973.
2 6 The Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Iranian 
Prime Minister's visit to Moscow in August 1973 stated 'The 
two sides expressed the intention to promote the realisation 
of the idea of creating a system of Collective Security in 
Asia', Pravda, August 13, 19 73.
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Cooperation in Europe the USSR laid much emphasis on the 
notion of extending collective security to Asia. Soviet 
press reports cited India as one of the countries which had
evaluated the Soviet idea of making Asia a continent of peace
27 .positively. However, the Joint Declaration following
Mrs Gandhi's visit to Moscow in June 19 76, was once again
silent on the issue. When she was asked for her opinion
about holding a conference on security in Asia similar to
the Helsinki Conference Mrs Gandhi reportedly replied that
security depends on many factors and in her view the most
important was stability based on economic strength. Therefore
she stated that bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation
2 8was the best way of ensuring security.
The evasiveness of Mrs Gandhi's reply coupled with the 
lack of explicit public mention of the collective security 
idea by the Indians indicates that the earlier resistance 
was maintained.
(e) Super Power Detente: The Indian Response
Superpower detente was the principal development on the 
international front in the early seventies. The Soviet Union 
regarded it as a major foreign policy success and never lost 
an opportunity to impress on other states the positive 
contribution of this development to the relaxation of 
international tension.
27 See R.H. Donaldson, Soviet-Indian Alignment; Quest for 
Influence (Monograph Series m  World Affairs, University of 
Denver, Vol.16, 1977), p.39.
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Despite the friendship between the Soviet Union and India 
the Soviet enthusiasm for detente did not strike a responsive 
chord in its Indian ally. In fact India was suspicious that 
in the mutual 'give and take' involved in the process of 
detente decisions could be taken that could adversely affect 
its interests. Indian spokesmen time and again expressed 
misgivings about it. A typical expression of Indian scepticism 
was voiced by Mrs Gandhi as follows:
Can we be certain that the new and more 
realistic relations between the great 
powers do in fact indicate a more stable 
world order? Or are they yet another 
attempt to reinforce the old concept of 
balance of power? ... We must be vigilant 
against big power arrangements for the 
creation of new spheres of i n f l u e n c e . 29
During Mr Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi in 197 3 it
is very likely that he attempted to convince the Indians to
modify their interpretation of Soviet-American detente as
super power hegemony. His public utterances on the matter
constituted a warm endorsement of detente. The Joint
Declaration emerging from the Brezhnev visit reflected Soviet
failure to assuage Indian doubts. A glowing and detailed
Soviet appraisal of detente highlighting 'the important
contribution made to the improvement of the general
international situation as a result of Soviet-American summit
30talks' was followed by a none too enthusiastic Indian response.,
29 Foreign Affairs Record, June 1973, p.226.
30 Pravda, December 1, 1973.
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between the USA and USSR since 'this step facilitates the
31easing of world tension'.
A perceptive Indian journalist reporting about the
Soivet-Indian haggling on this point made the interesting
observation that there was nothing in the view that the
super powers were seeking to carve the world into spheres
32of influence. Thus although the Indians had toned down 
their criticism their distrust of superpower detente seems 
to have remained.
(e) India's Chinese Policy Shift
As has been noted earlier probably the most important
factor cementing Indo-Soviet friendship is their common
perceptions of China as a potential threat and therefore
their mutual desire to stem the spread of Chinese influence
in South Asia. Thus Indian attitudes towards China are of
relevance in assessing whether Indian stances were in
consonance with Soviet desires.
Sino-Indian relations had thawed out somewhat around
1970, for the first time since the border conflict of 1962.
The requirements of normalisation were discussed between
33Indian and Chinese diplomats in various capitals. The events 
of 19 71 ended any prospect of an immediate breakthrough.
31 ibid.
32 Kuldip Nayar in The Statesman, December 4, 19 73.
33 Bhabhani Sengupta, Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s 
and Beyond (New York, Praeger, 1976), p.152.
It was stated that India welcomed the relaxation of tension
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prospects of an improved relationship with China in order to
enhance its own diplomatic 'elbow room'. China, however,
did not respond. In subsequent years China tried to isolate
India in South Asia, supported insurgencies in North-East
India so as to undermine domestic order, and attempted to
discredit India as a 'lackey of Moscow'. Thus normalisation
of relations was not possible.
In early 19 76 there were several indications that India
was making fresh overtures towards China. India invited
China to participate in a UNESCO Conference, supported
Chinese candidature for membership of the Asian Development
Bank and Mrs Gandhi signed the book of condolences in the
34Chinese Embassy when Chou En-lai died. China also
reciprocated such gestures.
These developments caused concern in Moscow. The
Soviets made several attempts to wean India away from the
drift towards normalisation with China. Soviet propaganda
emphasised the importance of Indo-Soviet ties. At the Twenty
Fifth CPSU Congress Brezhnev condemned China and vowed to
continue an uncompromising struggle against its reactionary
policies. He followed this up by praising India to a degree
35unprecedented in the forum. In addresses to the Congress
34 Pushpesh Pant, 'Major Developments in India's Foreign Policy 
and Relations: January-June 1976' International Studies 
(New Delhi), January-March 1977, p.51.
35 Pravda, February 25, 1976.
After the Indo-Pakistani war India attempted to probe the
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and in interviews on Moscow television CPI Chariman S.A. Dange 
and General Secretary Rao also attacked China and sought
3 6to remind Mrs Gandhi of the dangers of dealing with Beijing.
Oblivious to Soviet concern on 15 April 19 76 it was 
announced in the Parliament that India was upgrading its 
diplomatic representation in Beijing to the ambassadorial 
level. The Soviet Union's response to this major step 
towards normalisation of Sino-Indian relations was decidely 
unenthusiastic. When the Indian Prime Minister visited Moscow
in June 1976, just prior to the arrival of the Indian
... . 37Ambassador in Beijing, China was a subject of discussion.
The Joint Declaration released at the culmination of the
visit was curiously silent on the issue.
The omission is unlikely to have been accidental since
the communique dealt at length on the similar decision by
38India and Pakistan to exchange ambassadors and welcomed it. 
Thus it is more likely that disagreement between India and the 
Soviet Union about the importance of the move resulted in its 
not being mentioned.
The above examination of the major political issues 
that dominated Indo-Soviet relations during this period does 
not highlight any glaring instance of India adopting foreign 
policy postures closer to those of the Soviet Union which it
36 See FEER, March 19, 1976, pp.22-23.
37 Mrs Gandhi herself admitted this at a press conference m  
Moscow, Times of India, June 15, 1976.
o p Pravda, June 14, 1976.
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would not have done in the absence of Soviet pressure on it. 
Here it needs to be pointed out that on a wide variety of 
international issues such as support for the Palestinian 
quest for a homeland and opposition to South Africa the 
Indian and Soviet stances were similar or identical. But 
such common positions were arrived at by both the countries 
pursuing their own interests.
Nevertheless, India did at times how deference to Soviet 
sensibilities. The most obvious instance was in the Indian 
attitude to superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean. India 
not only drew a distinction between Soviet and US activities 
in the Indian Ocean and consequently channelled its criticism 
towards the US base at Diego Garcia, but also accepted the 
validity of the Soviet objection to the 'Zone of Peace' 
proposal. Yet it never did abandon or even reduce its 
support for the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone 
of Peace. To do so would have been contrary to a major 
Indian goal of enhancing its influence in its own region.
Thus while there was a change of style the essence of Indian 
opposition to superpower presence remained.
Such deference was however not one-sided. Despite its 
well known advocacy of nuclear non-proliferation the Soviet 
Union chose to ignore India's potentially destabilising 
detonation of a nuclear device and also indirectly supported 
Indian opposition to declaring South Asia as a nuclear free 
zone. In short Soviet concessions to India were as conspicuous 
as the reverse.
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While there had been mutual 'give and take' this period 
was also marked by Indian suspicion of the Soviets and a 
desire on the part of India to keep its distance from the 
Soviet Union. Indian criticism of detente testifies the 
former observation while its reluctance to endorse the Asian 
Collective Security plan and its desire to normalise relations 
with China indicate the validity of the latter assertion.
There is little evidence to support the perception 
that in the wake of the signing of the treaty India pitched 
its diplomatic posture closer to the Soviet Union and the 
two worked together on all international issues.
A combination of factors account for Soviet inability 
to influence India to adopt postures closer to its own 
despite the close ties between the two countries. The 
Indians seemed to have assessed that India-Soviet friendship 
cost the Soviets precious little. Mrs Gandhi once revealed
'The U.S.S.R. has come to our support at the right time at
3 9no cost to them'.  ^ While Soviet support for India had 
intensified Sino-Soviet verbal denunciations it had not led 
to a Sino-Soviet confrontation. The US did not accuse the 
Soviets of 'expansionism' in India and had not made Soviet 
support for New Delhi an issue in negotiating detente.
The awareness of low cost to the Soviet Union for its support 
for Indian enhanced India's bargaining position and decreased 
Soviet ability to influence India.
Quoted in Bhabhani Sengupta, op.cit., p.154.39
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Domestically, there was a progressive weakening of the
pro-Moscow lobby in India. The Communist Party of India's
(CPI) leverage over the government had weakened drastically.
The overwhelming Congress victories in the March 1971
Parliamentary elections and the 1972 state elections reduced
Mrs Gandhi's earlier need for CPI support. Furthermore, the
certification of the progressive credentials of Mrs Gandhi
by Soviet leaders diminished the CPI's ability to criticise
the ruling party's policies as insufficiently radical, thus
. . 40leaving it a redundant appendage m  Indian politics. For
an indigenous Communist party which ceases to criticise
41had no intellectual basis for continued existence.
Finally whatever little influence the CPI had by virtue 
of its parliamentary support to Mrs Gandhi vanished with 
the imposition of the 'emergency' and the reduction of the 
parliament to a mere 'rubber stamp'. The composition of the 
group of top advisers to Mrs Gandhi, which had been pro-Moscow 
also underwent a change. The death of D.P. Dhar, considered 
to be the architect of the Indo-Soviet treaty, and Mohan 
Kumaramangalam (an influential Minister in Mrs Gandhi's 
Cabinet and a former Communist party member) and the retirement 
of P.N. Haksar (Personal Secretary to the PM, whos anti- 
American sentiments were hardly disguised), roughly coincided 
with the rise in the influence of the Prime Minister's rabidly 
anti-Communist son, Sanjay, in 1975.
40 See R.H. Donaldson, op.cit., pp.18-19.
41 G. Jukes, Soviet Union m  Asia, p.113.
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The lack of responsiveness of India to Soviet pressure 
may at least partly be attributed to this dimunition in the 
fortunes of the pro-Moscow lobby in India.
More importantly the inability of the Soviet Union to 
translate the close ties and prestige into influence over 
India on specific issues stems from the reduction of Indian 
need for the Soviet Union. During the era of individed 
Pakistan India had a constant need for Soviet support since 
Pakistan sought the help of external powers in attempting 
to maintain parity with India and denying India predominance 
in South Asia. India's dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 
resulted in its emergence as the dominant power in South Asia. 
Ironically, the Soviet Union by helping India became the 
unchallenged indigenous power in South Asia had thereby 
contributed to reducing Indian need for Soviet support.
It is this reduced need that largely accounts for India 
being able to maintain its distance from the USSR.
Though diminished, India's need for Soviet support 
continued. Partly it was because of India's inability to 
translate military success into political influence. After 
the initial honeymoon relations with Bangladesh deteriorated 
rapidly, especially after Mujib-ur-Rehman's death in August 
1975. Pakistan ingeniously manoeuvred to maintain its distance 
and it was only in 1976 that ambassadorial level contacts 
were restored between the two countries. Partly, also, because 
relations with the USA, which had reached their nadir in 1971,
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although showing some improvement remained low key. Probably 
much more important that for much of the period Sino-Indian 
relations remained deadlocked (the movement towards 
normalisation began only in 1976) and India needed the Soviet 
Union to counter perceived Chinese hostility. But since 
this need was mutual even here Soviet bargaining capacities 
were not very strong. This mutual need was reflected in 
both sides making concessions in deference to each other*s 
sensibilities.
II
The theoretical underpinnings of Indo-Soviet economic
relations as enshrined in the treaty were forthright enough
to serve as the basis for closer and deeper economic ties
between the signatories. Article VI declared:
Attaching great importance to economic, 
scientific and technological cooperation 
between them, the high contracting parties 
will continue to consolidate and expand 
mutually advantageous and comprehensive 
cooperation in these fields as well as 
expand trade, transport and cooperation 
between them on the basis of principles 
of equality, mutual benefit and most 
favoured nation treatment.42
The thrust of this section is to assess whether the 
actualisation of this provision resulted in India's economy 
becoming increasingly reliant on the USSR.
See text provided in Appendix.
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Indo-Soviet Joint Commission and 'Dovetailing' of Plans 
Just over a year after signing of the treaty, on 
September 19, 1972, an agreement was signed to set up a
Joint Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical
4 3 . . . .Cooperation. This was to establish an institutional
framework to carry out the provisions of Article VI.
Its novelty lay in that its principle task was to
44'dovetail' the five year plans of the two countries. In
effect this meant that in areas of cooperation decided upon,
each country adjusted its production plans to fit those of
the other. Thus this first step resulted in linking the
two countries more closely economically.
This step however cannot be interpreted as being similar
45to the arrangement between COMECON countries. The 
arrangement was a bilateral one limited to certain specific 
economic units. Membership of COMECON entailed integrating a 
country's economy into a system of multilateral arrangements 
extending over most areas of economic activity.
The principle involved in the bilateral arrangement, made 
sound economic sense. Since both countries were planned economies
if they were to help each other their plans needed to take 
each other's requirements into account. This was no different
43 BBC SWB, SY/4098/A4/2.
44 See R.V.R. Chandrasekhara Rao, 'Indo-Soviet Economic 
Relations', Asian Survey, August 1973, p.796.
45 . . .For such interpretations see ibid.
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from the argument that India was pressing upon the EEC 
countries to vacate in their own interests those areas of 
production in which developing countries were qualified to 
specialise.
Therefore, while a certain amount of coordination came
to be established between the planning bodies of the two
states, India resisted the Soviet proposal for 'integration'
46of the two economies. Furthermore, despite speculation that 
India may join COMECON Mrs Gandhi persistently denied any 
such intention.47
Trade and Aid
While trade and aid have different meanings and are to 
be distinguished, in common usage the USSR does not make any
distinction between the two. Indeed trade is considered
48 . .as a special kind of aid. Since in Soviet perception the
two are inextricably interlinked they are dealt with together
here. Besides there is a sound economic reason why the two
cannot be treated separately. India's trade with the Soviet
Union is an essential part of the credit arrangements.
There is an automatic conversion of aid as well as debt
49repayments into trade flows.
46 Bhabani Sengupta, op.cit., p.150.
47 See Rao, op.cit., p.798.
48 See A.L. Datar, India's Economic Relations with the U.S.S.R. 
and Eastern Europe: 1953 to 1969 (Cambridge University Press, 
1972), p.2.
49 .For an elucidation of this aspect see Dharm Narain,
Aid Through Trade, UNCTAD Document No.TD/B/C.3/57.
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The distinctive feature of all economic transactions 
between India and the Soviet Union is that since 1958-59 
they are covered by comprehensive non-convertible rupee 
payment arrangements. From India's point of view in the 1960s 
the advantages of such an arrangement were fairly obvious. 
First, given the extreme shortage of foreign exchange in the 
Indian economy the introduction of rupee trade added to 
India's import capacity, at the same time underwriting an 
expansion in exports. Second, in the absence of this trade, 
economic assistance fromtiie USSR in the form of development 
credits would have been greatly reduced. Third, debt servicing 
burden was reduced since repayments were not in scarce 
convertible foreign currencies but in exports or domestic 
currency. What is more it helped India in reducing its 
dependence on the West.
In view of these advantages the growth in India's trade 
with the USSR was very rapid in the 1960s, as the table shows:
Table 1: USSR's Share in India's Imports
and Exports
(in Percentage)
Year Imports Exports
1951-52 0.1
1.4
6.5
0.9
4.5
13.7
1960-61
1970-71
Source: R.K. Sharma, The Economics of Indo-Soviet 
Trade (New Delhi, Allied, 1979), p.102.
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Given the growth in trade in the 1960s, the closer
political ties in the 1970s and the emphasis placed in the
Treaty on expanding trade, it could have been expected that
Indo-Soviet trade would grow and enhance the Indian economic
links on the USSR. This seemed to be the apparent trend in
the years following the signing of the Treaty. One scholar
noted that between 1972 and 1974 the two countries concluded
50as many as forty agreements of an economic nature. The 
most important one was the 15 Year Agreement on Economic and 
Trade Cooperation, signed during Brezhnev's visit in November
5119 73, with both sides pledging to enhance their trade relations.
Although the USSR continued to be one of India's major
trade partners and annual trade turnover rose from just over
52Rs 4,000 million an 1973 to about Rs 7,000 million m  1975
much of this rise was due to increase in prices, especially
of petroleum products, fertilisers and newsprint, which were
a major sector of Indian imports. This increase was not expected
to continue. The 5-year trade agreement signed in April 1975,
to cover the period 1976-80, envisaged an increase of Rs 2,350
53million for the period. Even progress towards achievement 
of this target was tardy and the concern of the two countries
50 Bhabhani Sengupta, op.cit., p.150.
51 Foreign Affairs Record, November 19 73, p.446.
52 Reserve Bank of India (hereafter referred to as RBI),
Report on Currency and Finance, 1976-77, Vol.2.
53 . . .Economic and Political Weekly, April 17, 1976, p.581.
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was expressed in the Joint Declaration at the conclusion
of Mrs Gandhi's visit. The communique exhorted both countries
54to explore new areas and new methods of cooperation.
Notwithstanding such concern, the growth in annual trade
between the two countries from Rs 3,150 million in 1970-71
55to about Rs 7,700 million in 1976-77 is impressive and 
suggests increased reliance on the Soviet Union. This increase 
in Indo-Soviet trade was far surpassed by the increase in 
total Indian trade with USA as well as EEC members. The 
following tables put the picture in perspective.
Table 2: India's Imports
(Value in Thousand US Dollars)
USSR USA EEC
1971 102,920 551,967 603,531
1972 102,690 316,369 664,976
1973 119,861 560,191 837,294
1974 492,194 710,216 937,510
1975 258,236 1 ,407,591 1,311,057
1976 181,001 1 ,343,284 986,975
Table 3: India's Exports
(Value in Thousand US
USSR USA EEC
1971 280,994 331,583 373,751
1972 367,790 369,599 510,667
1973 389,565 403,934 671,798
1974 469 ,920 509,552 869,773
1975 509,444 486,077 881,300
1976 483,114 634,863 1,332,958
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 
(UN, New York), 1976 and 1981.
Pravda, June 14, 1976.
55 RBI, Report on Currency and Finance 19 77-78.
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Not only was the growth in Indo-Soviet trade outstripped by 
growth in India's trade with USA and the EEC states, but in 
fact the relative weight of Soviet imports and epxorts in the 
total picture, after peaking in the early 19 70s, declined.
Table 4: USSR's Share in India's Exports and Imports
(in Percentage)
Imports Exports
1970 7.9 13.4
1971 4.3 13.8
1972 4.6 15.2
1973 3.8 13.1
1974 9.5 12.0
1975 4.1 11.7
1976 3.3 9.0
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 
(United Nations, New York), 1979.
In the aid sphere the record was no better. In the 
1950s and 1960s all significant sectors of the Indian economy 
such as steel, oil, machine building, power, pharmaceuticals 
etc. received substantial and crucial assistance from the 
Soviet Union. While it is true that the magnitude of Soviet 
aid was less than aid from the West in qualitative terms it 
was impressive. The momentum of Soviet aid waned towards the 
end of the sixties and there were no new Soviet credits 
extended during the period under survey. The last instance of 
Soviet aid was the 300 million rouble aid package granted in
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1966, and two thirds of that had yet to be utilised by the 
end of 1976 .“^  In contrast from 1971-72 to 1976-77, the 
economic assistance provided by the 'Aid India Consortium'
consisting of Western industrialised countries was Rs 67,524
• n  • 57 million.
The above survey not only indicates that the Soviet 
position in India's external economic interactions was not 
dominant but also suggests that the relative prominence of 
the Soviet Union since the treaty had not been enhanced.
This stagnation in trade and deceleration of aid can 
be primarily attributed to the changed needs of the Indian 
economy.
During the 1950s and 1960s Soviet aid to India generally 
involved project aid to the public sector for heavy industrial 
equipment and Indian imports from the Soviet Union were 
largely capital goods. Utilising external assistance from 
the Soviet Union and the West, India pursued a policy of 
industrialisation with an emphasis on heavy industry. By 
the late 1960s growth of industry created a potential for a 
self-sustaining and self-accelerating process of technological 
change and development. The high degree of self-reliance 
achieved shifted India's demand away from capital goods.
The expansion and diversification of the production structure 
led to significant changes in India's economic requirements.
S.S. Aiyer, 'No Projects in Sight for Using Soviet Loan', 
Times of India, June 6, 1977.
57 Calculated from Economic Survey (Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India), 1981-82.
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As its industry had come of age India's need was for 
intermediate products or maintenance imports such as 
fertilisers, newsprint and raw materials such as oil and 
non-ferrous minerals. Therefore the traditional pattern 
of Soviet exports and economic assistance was no longer 
appealing. Since the Soviet Union was either hard pressed 
to fulfill such neess or for variety of systemic and political 
reasons refused to adapt, there was a fall in Indian utilisation 
of Soviet credits and also in Indian imports from the USSR.
There was also other factors which contributed 
specifically to the stagnation of trade and fall in aid.
On the trade front there was an increased Indian awareness 
that Soviet economic behaviour, in essence, was no better 
than the behaviour of the so-called Western imperialists.
Two instances of Soviet economic behaviour were particularly
galling, as far as the Indians were concerned. The first
\occurred in 1974 when the Soviets demanded Rs 4,200 per ton
for newsprint as compared to Rs 2,848 charged by Canada and
5 8Rs 3,393 by Bangladesh. Thi^ s resulted in negotiations 
being stalled and led to a newsprint shortage in India. Many 
nespapers had to sharply cut back the number of pages and 
most sections of the Indian press termed the Soviet actions 
as 'newsprint blackmail'. Nevertheless the Soviets did not 
give in and Indina had to agree to the price demanded.
Another incident of the apparent Russian quest for one-sided
c o
FEER, July 15, 1974 ,., pp.42-43.
advantages occurred in 1975. A Soviet trade delegation
negotiating the export of fertiliser, wanted a 60% to 70%
increase in price. When the Indians refused to comply the
59Soviets scaled down the increase to 35% to 40%. Moreover, 
there were recurrent charges of 'switch trading' by the USSR. 
The contention was that the Soviet Union re-exported Indian 
commodities to the West and earned hard currency. This reduced 
India's markets and also was a loss for India in terms of 
earning foreign exchange since all Indo-Soviet trade was in 
rupees. While such charges were difficult to substantiate 
there was some evidence of such practice.® Such Soviet 
behaviour is likely to have dampened Indian enthusiasm for 
trading with the Russians.
In the aid sphere the attraction of Soviet aid waned not 
only because of Soviet inability to change the form of its 
aid but also because of the changes in the attitudes of 
Western donors. Western donors were willing not only to 
extend aid to public sector projects but had also liberalised 
the terms of aid. When the USSR first entered the field of 
aid in India its terms were generally considered to be the 
most favourable. Repayments were spread over some 12-20 years 
at 2 1/2 per cent per annum interest. In the 19 70s Western
59 «. See R.H. Donaldson, 'The Second World, The Third World and 
the New International Economic Order', Strategic Issues 
Research Memorandum (US Army War Colleqe), April 25, T980, 
p.19.
^  For example see N. Ambegaokar, 'India's Trade with East 
European Countries - Trends and Prospects', RBI Bulletin,
March 1974, pp.459-467.
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donors made significant changes. In 1973 Britain stopped
charging interest and stretched repayment periods to twenty
five years^ and from 19 75 provided all assistance in the
6 2form of grants. Belgium cut its rate of interest from
2 per cent to 1 per cent and West Germany offered its aid on
IDA terms. While the Aid India Consortium members made
changes in their terms to make them more attractive the
Soviet terms remained the same as they were in the 1950s.
Indian attempts to persuade the Soviets to provide more
64flexible terms were of no avail. In fact the Soviets 
made efforts to unilaterally revise the rupee-ruble exchange 
rate from 11.39 to 8.66 rubles per hundred rupees. This 
would have meant an addition of $160 million to an Indian 
debt which in mid-1976 stood at $450 million.^ During the 
period under survey the Indians resisted stubbornly and the 
issue remained unsolved. Such Soviet behaviour coupled with 
the liberalisation in the Western terms of aid made India 
look more often towards Western donors and consequently Soviet 
credits were utilised at a slow pace.
fi 1 Times of India, November 10, 19 73.
6 2 Economic Survey, 1975-76
6 3 Ian Clark, op.cit., p.149.
64 Although Indian spokesmen rarely refer to such sensitive 
matters Finance Minister Chavan reporting to Parliament on his 
trip to Moscow in 1974 stated, 'Opportunity was taken to hold 
discussions with Soviet authorities on matters of mutual 
economic interest like softening of the terms of Soviet 
credits ...' Lok Sabha Debates (Fifth Series), July 26, 1974, 
Vol.XLI, No.5, Cl.2.
 ^ R.H. Donaldson, op.cit., p.19.
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Thus one can conclude that there were factors of a fairly 
permanent character holding back the elevation of Indo-Soviet 
economic ties to a qualitatively different plane.
Ill
The nexus between USSR as a supplier and India as a 
purchaser of military equipment is an important facet of the 
bilateral relationship since it is often asserted that India's 
dependence on the Soviet Union for arms supplies provides the 
latter an important form of leverage over Indian policies.
This section therefore assesses the extent of India's 
dependence on the Soviet Union for military equipment in the 
aftermath of the Treaty.
As a prelude to assessing arms flows from the Soviet 
Union to India from 19 71 onwards it needs to be stressed 
that the emergence of cordial Indo-Soviet ties in the mid- 
1950s was not immediately followed by the supply of Soviet 
military equipment to India, unlike the USSR's simultaneous 
courting of Egypt. In the 1950s the vast majority of the 
arms bought by India came from Britain and major acquisitions 
from either super power were avoided.^ Partly in response 
to the emerging strains in the Sino-Indian relationship India's 
procurement policy shifted in 1960 with the purchase of Soviet 
transport aircraft and helicopters, ostensibly of a non-combat
6 6 For a listing of weapons acquired by India in the 1950s see 
Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, Almquist and Wiksell, 1971), pp.833-836.
nature. Further progress along this line was made in August
1962 when an agreement was reached, in pricniple, to supply
6 8Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to India. But it was only after 
the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 that major arms deliveries 
were made to India by the USSR, as well as by USA, Canada, 
France, Australia and the traditional supplier Britain.
From 1965 onwards, India increasingly began to acquire 
Soviet weaponry. The factors explaining India's increasing 
dependence on the Soviet Union include the cutback in US 
arms sales to South Asia, the intersection of Soviet and 
Indian security interests owing to a shared concern regarding 
China, and the Soviet willingness to accept repayments for 
arms purchases in the form of exports by India.
Thus by August 19 71 all the three branches of the Indian 
armed services were using Soviet equipment. The holdings 
of the Indian Army included 450 T-54/T-55 and 150 PT-76 tanks, 
substantial number of 100 mm and 130 mm guns, SA-2 Surface- 
to-Air missiles, OT-62 armoured personnel carriers. The 
airforce had 8 MiG-21 squadrons and 6 SU-7 squadrons as well 
as Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters. The Navy had an assortment of 
naval craft such as Foxtrot-class submarines, Petya-class 
frigates, Poluchat-class patrol boats and Osa-class torpedo
6 7
6 7 Girish Mishra, Contours of Indo-Soviet Cooperation (New 
Delhi, Allied, 1976), p.120.
6 8 P.R. Chari, 'Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review', 
Asian Survey, March 1979, p.233.
69 . .See Military Balance, 1970-1971 (London, IISS, 1971).
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In terms of the general supply of Soviet military 
equipment to India, it does not appear that the signing of 
the Treaty marked any significant change of policy. The 
following table illustrates the nature and extent of major 
Indian arms purchases from the USSR since 1971.
Table 5: Comparison of Soviet Arms Supplies to India 
Before and After the Treaty of 1971
1963-71 1972-76
Armoured PT-76 tanks (150) T-54/T-55 tanks (450)
Vehicles T-54/T-55 tanks (450)
Aircraft MiG-21 combat a.c. (117)
SU-7 combat a.c. (150) 
An-12 tpt a.c. (16)
Mi-4 helicopters (82) 
MiG-21 UTI (14)
MiG-21 MF combat a.c.(7) 
IL-38 Maritime
reconnaissance(7) 
KA-25 ASW helicopter (5)
Naval 'Polnocny' class
Vessels landing craft
'Poluchat' class fast 
patrol boats (6) 
'Petya' class 
frigates (2) 
'Foxtrot' class 
submarines (4)
'Polnocny' class landing 
craft (4)
'Osa' class torpedo 
boat (8)
'Petya' class frigates(4) 
'Foxtrot' class 
submarines (4) 
'Nanuchka' class 
corvettes (8)
Sources: The Arms Trade with the Third World (SIPRI);
Annual Issues of Military Balance 1970-77;
World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 
1972-77, and Jane's Flghting~Ships, 1972-77.
The above figures reveal, although there was no change 
in the tempo or range of Indian acquisitions from the Soviet 
Union, that India's main air and naval strike force 
acquisitions were supplied by the Soviet Union. This however
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should not be misconstrued to mean that the Soviet Union was
virtually India's sole supplier of military equipment. Prior
to passing any judgement on the degree of Indian dependence
on Soviet arms supplies the extent of diversification in
arms purchases as well as the extent of indigenous defence
production need to be taken into account.
India ihas highly developed policies in both these areas.
While the majority of new acquisitions continued to be of
Soviet origin some interesting examples of diversification
were evident. In the case of Britain the most prominent
examples were the arrangements with Hawker-Siddeley for the
manufacture of the Gnat by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
(HAL), and the licensed production of Leander class frigates.
The Vijayanta tank was being produced in India under license
from Vickers since 1967. India also purchased 6 Westland
Sea King heliocpters and Seacat missiles during this period.
From France the purchases included Alouette III helicopters
and patrol boats, besides licensed production of assorted 
70missiles. While there is no gainsaying the fact that the 
USSR was India's major supplier, neither can the degree of 
diversification be totally ignored.
On the question of the capacity of India's indigenous 
defence industry it must be highlighted that amongst Third 
World countries India has one of the most ambitious and 
sophisticated defence programmes. The requirements of small
70 See'World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbooks 1972-77 
and also Military Balance, 1971-78.
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arms, bombs and munitions are fully met by domestic production. 
In addition various small naval vessels, aircraft bodies and 
engines are produced or are under development. Furthermore 
India has for long been pursuing a policy of increasing 
the proportion of indigenous content of its license produced 
equipment. Although this policy has not been an unmitigated 
success there are some impressive achievements. Aj.eet light­
weight aircraft has an indigenous content of 90%, similar
was the case of MiG-21M fighter produced by HAL. The
. . .  . 72Vijayanta medium battle tank has a 95% indigenous content.
Such progress notwithstanding, India continued to be 
reliant on foreign suppliers since deploying scarce resources 
for developing only the defense production sector would have 
been a chimerical pursuit that would have distorted the 
macro-economic structure and created tensions within the 
socio-political system.
In the light of the above discussion while admitting 
that the bulk of India's most impressive military equipment 
originated in the USSR, on balance it could still be argued 
that there is no evidence to indicate an increase in Indian 
dependence on Soviet weaponry. Furthermore there was some 
diversification and an increasingly important domestic capacity.
71 World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 19 77, 
pp.304-305.
72 ibid., pp.298-299.
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The reasons for India continuing to purchase Soviet 
arms in view of its not attaining self-reliance were largely 
similar to those that have been outlined earlier in explaining 
India's shift towards Soviet equipment in the mid-1960s.
One final point needs to be made. In the context of India's 
policy of reducing dependence on external suppliers of defence 
equipment Soviet arms are especially suitable.
Changes in Soviet weaponry proceed gradually from one 
generation to another. This ensures the availability of a 
larger percentage of interchangeable parts in each family 
of Soviet weaponry. In practical terms this permits 
progressively more sophisticated armaments to be inducted 
easily into the armed forces. The problem of maintenance and 
improvisation is simpler with established engineering 
facilities. Western equipment, on the other hand, generally 
progresses from one generation to another through radically 
new design concepts. As new generations of weaponry are 
procured different logistics arrangements are required. A 
recipient country's dependence upon Western suppliers is
73consequently unlikely to decrease over a period of time.
IV
Summing up the major dimensions of Indo-Soviet relations 
it could be said that while both sides valued the relationship 
highly there is little evidence of an increase in Indian
This line of reasoning is drawn from P.R. Chari, op.cit.73
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dependence on the Soviet Union and an enhancement of Soviet 
leverage over Indian foreign policy. In short the Soviet 
'quest for the spoils that go with victory1 did not achieve 
the desired success.
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CHAPTER IV
THE JANATA INTERREGNUM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
Thirty years of Congress rule in India ended in March 
1977, when a hastily assembled electoral front, the Janata 
Party, was voted into power. Although the election was 
contested almost excluisvely on domestic issues all indications 
were that foreign policy too would undergo changes.
It was a matter of record that some groups that now 
constituted the Janata Party had been consistently critical 
of trends in Indo-Soviet relations under the previous regime, 
the former Jana Sangh and Swatantia groups having expressed 
particularly strong reservations about the Indo-Soviet treaty.^ 
During the election camapign Mr Morarji Desai (later to become 
Prime Minister of the Janata government) had stated that if
2his party came to power the treaty might 'automatically go'. 
Additionally, in the past the Soviet Union had eulogised 
the Congress government and had lent enthusiastic support 
to the declaration of the 'state of emergency' under which
3many members of the new government had been imprisoned.
 ^ For criticism of the Indo-Soviet treaty by Janata (and pro- 
Janata) stalwarts such as Morarji Desai, Piloo Mody,
J.B. Kripalani and M.R. Masani, expressed at a New Delhi 
seminar, see A.P. Jain (ed), Shadow of the Bear: The Indo- 
Soviet Treaty (New .Delhi, P.KT Deo, 1972) .
2 Quoted in S.C. Gangal, 'Trends in India's Foreign Policy' 
in K.P. Mishra (ed), Janata's Foreign Policy (New Delhi,
Vikas, 1979), p.30.
3 For Brezhnev's praise of Mrs Gandhi see Pravda, June 9, 1976; 
for Soviet press comment see Y. Gotlober and Shatkyanov, 
'Controlling Reactionaries in India', New Times, July 1975,
No.27, pp.10-11 and 'Reactionaries Lost Wager', Izvestia, 
November 23, 19 75.
77
Even while the election campaign was underway the Soviet 
press supported the Congress and denounced the Janata as
4a group of 'extreme reactionaries'. Finally, the implacable
hostility of the rightist constituents and the suspicions
of the leftist constituents of the Janata towards the pro-
Moscow CPI appeared to signal a further decline of the pro-
Soviet lobby's ability to influence foreign policy decisions.
On assumption of office the Janata was quick to underline
its foreign policy. While it reiterated India's commitment
to non-alignment it emphasised, time and again, that it
5would be 'genuine' or 'proper' non-alignment, the evident 
implication being that in the past India's close relations 
with the Soviet Union had compromised its non-aligned status.
This chapter assesses the functioning of Indo-Soviet 
relations during the era of 'genuine non-alignment' under 
the Janata government (March 1977-July 1979) and the short­
lived coalition government headed by Mr Charan Singh (July- 
December 19 79) , the leader of a breakaway faction of the 
Janata, which succeeded it.
I
Despite expectations to the contrary the close relations 
between India and the Soviet Union were maintained by the
4 See V. Tretyakov, 'Election Manifestoes', New Times, March 
1977, No.11, p.5 and V. Shurygin, 'On the Eve of Voting',
Pravda, March 14, 1977.
5 . . .For major statements highlighting genuine non-alignment
see report of Desai's first press conference in Times of India, 
March 25, 1977 and Foreign Minister Vajpayee's address to 
Lok Sabha on June 29, 19 77, Lok Sabha Debates, June 29, 1977, 
Vol.3 (Sixth Series), No.16, Cls.191-206.
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Janata government. It had been expected by many that the 
Indo-Soviet treaty would be terminated. A balanced 
relationship with the superpowers, envisaged by 'genuine 
non-alignment' , it was felt could not be achieved as long 
as the treaty linking India and USSR remained in force.
Yet, the Janata government did not scrap or even modify 
the treaty. In fact the new government made it explicit 
that it wanted to maintain the friendship existing between
gthe two countries. Once the initial misgivings regarding 
the continuance of Indo-Soviet ties were allayed, cordial 
relations were maintained throughout the Janata period.
The continuity in Indo-Soviet relations underscored 
above should not be construed as suggesting that the 
relationship was on a par with that existing while Mrs Gandhi 
was in office. Within the broad framework of continuity 
there were several significant changes of style, substance 
and emphasis.
Firstly the Janata government enhanced the manoeuvrability 
of its foreign policy by improving relations with the USA 
considerably. President Carter and Prime Minister Desai 
exchanged visits. The Indo-US Joint Commission took a number 
of steps to intensify cooperation in a variety of fields.
While the US continued to be India's most important trading
 ^ See Vajpayee's speech at the luncheon in honour of Gromyko 
on April 26, 1977, Foreign Affairs Record, April 1977, 
pp.71-74 and also Desai's speech at a dinner in Moscow on 
October 21, 1977, Foreign Affairs Record, October 1977.
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partner further plans were laid to increase growth in trade. 
The cordiality in Indo-US relations seemed to be on the scale 
of the early Kennedy years, the period of the warmest 
relationship.
To be sure, there were differences. The outlooks of
the two countries diverged on a number of international
issues, particularly on the Middle East and on super power
rivalry in the Indian Ocean. These differences were however
7not allowed to infringe upon the bilateral relationship.
The issue that caused discomfort in bilateral relations 
related to the supply of low-enriched uranium (LEU) by 
the US for the Tarapur power plant. There were escalating 
US demands that India submit its nuclear installations to 
full scope safeguards in return for continued US shipments 
of LEU. The Indians refused since it would have meant de 
facto signing of the NPT. While in the long run the matter 
remained unresolved the tensions were dissipated by President 
Carter's gesture of clearing shipments to meet immediate 
needs.
Secondly, and more directly related to the Indo-Soviet 
relationship, there was a notable change in the manner in 
which the Indo-Soviet treaty was referred to in official 
communiques. During the past the two sides used to declare
7 When asked in Parliament whether India had requested USA 
to dismantle Diego Garcia, Vajpayee replied that India did 
not 'regard Diego Garcia as a bilateral problem between India 
and the USA', Lok Sabha Debates, June 16, 19 77, Vol.2, No.5, 
Cls.157.
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their resolve of strengthening their relations 'on the basis'
of the treaty. Inthe Janata era the reference was to carry
gforward relations 'in the spirit' of the treaty. This was
a subtle dimunition by India of the treaty's role. It
confirms the interpretation given in usually well-informed
circles that the Janata government had insisted to the Soviet
Union that it was a distortion to base Indo-Soviet relations
on the treaty alone and that the treaty was no more than a
9symbol of decades of cordial Indo-Soviet relations.
Thirdly, the tenor of communiques promulgated at the 
conclusion of the high-level visits was not as warm as in 
the earlier period. Thus while in communiques issued after 
Mr Brezhnev's 1973 visit to India and Mrs Gandhi's 1976 
visit to Moscow the talks were described as being characterised 
by 'trust, friendship and mutual understanding', during high 
level visits in the Janata era the term 'trust1 was conspicuously 
absent.^ Similarly whereas the two sides had expressed 
'profound satisfaction' or 'deep satisfaction' at the level 
of their relations in 1973 and 1976, this was expressed 
merely as 'satisfaction' in 1977 and 1978.^
Finally, the exchanges of political compliments had become 
an integral part of high-level visits in the Gandhi era. For 
g See Foreign Affairs Record, April 1977, p.72 and Pravda,
October 27, 1977.
9 . .Dilip Padgaokar, 'Mr Desai's Soviet Visit', Times of India, 
October 29, 1977.
^  See Foreign Affairs Record, op.cit., and Pravda, op.cit.
^  R.H. Donaldson, Soviet-Indian Alignment, p.22.
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example, during Mrs Gandhi's 1976 visit she paid glowing
tributes to Mr Brezhnev and his associates for the management
12of the Soviet political system. In return Mr Brezhnev had 
lavished fulsome praise on the visiting dignitary and had 
commended her efforts against 'reactionaries at home and 
abroad'.
While individually these signs may appear to be obscure 
and remote, cumulatively they indicate, in general, a relative 
cooling down of Indo-Soviet relations.
On specific issues too, the earlier trend of lack of 
Indian responsiveness to Soviet needs was maintained (or 
enhanced further in cases where there had been some 
responsiveness earlier). This can be highlighted by 
examining Indian and Soviet attitudes towards major political 
issues that impinged on their relationship.
(a) Asian Collective Security
While the zest it had displayed in attempting to enlist 
Asian support for its Collective Security scheme in the 
first half of the seventies was no more evident, the Soviet 
quest to gain endorsement of the proposal had continued.
Thus when the Janata came into office several members of 
the Indian Parliament were eager to probe the government's 
attitude towards Collective Security. The matter was raised 
in the Lok Sabha and the government was closely questioned.
Mr Desai told the House that as far as he was aware the
Foreign Affairs Record, June 1976, pp.182-188. 
Pravda, June 9, 1976.
12
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Soviet Union had not fully spelt out the content and 
implications of the proposed security design. He however 
assured the members that if the plan meant the formation 
of a bloc or alliance his government was not interested in
*4- 14 it .
During Mr Desai's visit to Moscow in October 1977
Mr Brezhnev implicitly brought up the collective security
15idea. The Janata government was no more forthcoming 
than the previous regime. As had been the case earlier once 
again the final communique did not mention it indicating 
Soviet inability to gain Indian endorsement.^^ All subsequent 
Indo-Soviet communiques in the Janata period were silent 
too.
(b) Indian Ocean: 'Zone of Peace' and Super Power Rivalry 
Confirmation of the differing attitudes of the two 
countries towards declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace continued to be provided in votes that India and the 
USSR cast on the Indian Ocean resolutions in the United 
Nations General Assembly. While the Soviet Union continued 
to abstain India voted in favour of the resolution every 
year. In fact there is evidence to indicate that there was 
a further divergence in Soviet and Indian attitudes on the 
Indian Ocean issue.
Lok Sabha Debates, July 14, 1977, Vol.IV (Sixth series),
No.29, Cls.1-3.
Pravda, October 22, 1977.
^  ibid., October 27, 1977.
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The Indo-Soviet Joint Declarations during this period
while referring to the Indian Ocean no longer carried the
17usual Soviet disclaimer on international law. (Unlike
the Joint Declaration after Mrs Gandhi's 1976 visit.)
Furthermore in the communique issued after Mr Desai's visit
in 1977 the reference was to an 'exchange of opinions',
18indicating that agreement could not be arrived at.
More importantly, it may be recalled that Mrs Gandhi's
government had distinguished between Soviet and US activities
in the Indian Ocean and consequently had focussed criticism
on US operations. This distinction was blurred by the
Janata government. Mr Desai is on record as having stated,
It is wrong to state that the Soviet Union 
has no base whatsoever. It has its spheres 
of influence in the Indian Ocean. That 
cannot be denied. It is a race between 
the two powerful nations. It is from this 
that we have to save A s i a .
The implication was that the Soviet as well as US operations
were causing tension and insecurity in the littoral. The
External Affairs Minister, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, made
this explicit. In a statement to the Lok Sabha he asserted,
The house is fully aware of the government's 
view that the military presence of the great 
powers in the Indian Ocean is a cause of 
tension and insecurity in the area.20
17 .For example see Foreign Affairs Record, op.cit., and
Pravda, October 27, 1977.
Pravda, October 27, 1977.
19 Lok Sabha Debates, op.cit., Cl.6.
20 Quoted in R.H. Donaldson, op.cit., p.36.
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Also, a cursory glance at the parliamentary pronouncements 
by the External Affairs Minister on this subject reveals 
a noticeably less biased and more balanced Indian approach 
towards superpower rivalry. The earlier Indian deference 
to Soviet sensibilities was no longer evident.
(c) The Chinese 'Challenge': Differing Attitudes
The new government's position on normalisation of
relations with China was that while it was willing to do
so the initiatives for further improvement must come from
21China. From the end of 19 77 there were indications that
China was willing to further the process of normalisation.
Criticisms of India in Chinese media in general were
sharply curtailed. In February 1978, Vice Premier Deng
Xiao Ping, during a visit to Nepal was reported to have
stated at a press conference that China was eager to establish
22closer relations with India. Also in February a trade
delegation and a political delegation from the Chinese People's
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries arrived in 
23New Delhi. These were the first of their respective types 
since 1962. The Indian Foreign Minister was extended an
21 See Vajpayee's statement to Lok Sabha on August 5, 19 77 
reproduced in Indian and Foreign Review, August 15, 1977, 
p. 8.
22 Times of India, February 5,1978.
23 Nancy Jetly, 'Major Developments in India's Foreign Policy 
and Relations: January-June 1978', International Studies,
Vol.18, October-December, pp.357-358.
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invitation to visit Beijing and it was accepted in principle.
However there were continuing problems. The inauguration
in June 1978 of the Karakoram Highway linking China and
Pakistan was a reminder of the outstanding differences.
The road passed thorugh disputed Kashmir (or according to
India 'Pakistan Occupied Kashmir') and would tie into a
highway linking Tibet with Sinkiang passing through the
25Aksai Chin area which China had occupied m  1962.
Despite the slow pace of progress towards normalisation
and the continuing differences in Sino-Indian relations the
Soviet Union was disconcerted by these developments. It
perceived Chinese gestures towards India as part of a global
challenge mounted by China against it. In Soviet assessment
the Chinese overtures were designed to undermine Soviet
influence in South Asia and were linked to other Chinese moves
such as the conclusion of Sino-Japanese treaty, the escalating
tensions between China and Vietnam, Chairman Hua's provocative
visit to Yugoslavia and Rumania and the sudden progress in
Sino-US relations.
Thus Soviet discomfort was clearly evident at every
step that seemed to be indicating progress towards Sino-Indian
normalisation. The Soviet press mounted a campaign to lecture
2 6India on the dangers inherent in Peking's courtship. When
24 ibid., p.358.
25 Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter referred to as FEER), 
September 1, 1978, pp.18-19.
2 6 For example see A. Turanov, 'Road for Chinese Expansion',
New Times, No.21, September 21, 1978; SWB SU/5906/A3/2,
China's Subversive Activities' Against India.
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Mr Vajpayee visited Moscow in September 1978 just six weeks
prior to his scheduled visit to Beijing, he was exposed to
a barrage of anti-Chinese rhetoric by Soviet leaders. For
example Mr Gromyko criticised the Chinese actions as follows:
Recently, the aggressive essence of the 
Peking leadership's great-power hegemonistic 
policy has been exposed more and more 
clearly ... Can one show any vacillation 
in this situation? The schemes of the 
forces that are hostile to world peace 
and international security in Asia should 
be rebuffed, and rebuffed decisively. It 
is necesary to unmask and frustrate their 
aggressive designs and expansionist 
proclivities in time.27
The Indian Foreign Minister avoided identifying with such
a line of thinking. While he assured Soviet leaders that
normalisation of relations with China would not be at the
cost of Indo-Soviet ties he did not make any explicitly
anti-Chinese remarks. The differences in Indian and Soviet
perspectives precluded any mention of China in the final
2 8communique. In short Moscow's attempt to influence India 
proved futile.
Although Indian concern about the implications of closer 
Sino-US ties was undoubtedly heightened as a result of Deng's 
trip to Washington,Vajpayee cautiously went ahead with his 
visit to China in February 1979 (postponed earlier because 
of Vajpayee's hospitalisation). In many ways the results 
exceeded the anticipation. The Chinese agreed to India's
27 Pravda, September 13, 1978.
28 ..., ibid.
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view that the border problem in fact existed and held the
key to further progress of normalisation. Therefore the
two sides agreed that steps be taken to resolve the issue.
Moreover China seemed to have indicated that its support
for secessionist rebels in North Eastern India was a thing
of the past. Additionally there were agreements on cultural,
scientific and other exchanges as well as plans to expand
29trade. On matters of global concern such as the logic 
of disarmament, the inevitability of war and the prospects 
for detente, the two sides 'agreed to disagree'.
The positive achievements were obscured by China's 
incursion into Vietnam while the Indian Foreign Minister 
was still in China. Mr Vajpayee abruptly cut short his visit 
and returned to India earlier than scheduled as a protest 
against the Chinese action. India's friendly relations 
with Vietnam left the government with little choice but to 
decry the Chinese action. Anti-Chinese hostility was aroused 
in India by the similarity of China's action in Vietnam to 
its attack on India in 1962. More than 100 members of the 
Indian parliament demanded that resolutions be adopted 
condemning Chinese agression. Although the government made 
its opposition to the Chinese action plain and called on 
China to withdraw its forces it never went to the extent 
of branding China as the 'aggressor'.
29 See Vajpayee's report of his China's visit to Parliament, 
Lok Sabha Debates, February 21, 1979, Vol.XXII (Sixth Series); 
No.3, Cls.243-251.
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When the Soviet Premier Mr Kosygin visited New Delhi
in March 1979 he lambasted the Chinese action in every public
statement he made. Clearly the Soviet Union adopted the
diplomatic gambit of seeking to create the image of bilateral
agreement by unilaterally enunciating positions. Referring
to the Chinese issue in his address to the Indian Parliament
not only did Mr Kosygin condemn it as brazen aggression
but also asserted that forces had emerged in the world
that would not allow such an outrage. Such forces, he said,
30include India and the Soviet Union.
On his part Mr Desai was adroit in not identifying 
India with the Soviet assault. Though he deplored the events 
in Indo-China and called for withdrawal of troops he rarely 
mentioned China specifically, aid apparently made it clear 
that the process of normalisation of relations with China 
would continue when circumstances permitted.
The joint communique called for the immediate withdrawal 
of Chinese forces from Vietnam; but this was no great 
achievement for Mr Kosygin since India had held this position 
from the commencement of the crisis. More significantly, 
while the Soviet Prime Minster had consistently referred 
to Chinese 'aggression' in the course of his pronouncements 
in India, the joint communique refrained from the use of 
this term and instead alluded to the Chinese 'attack' on 
Vietnam.
30 Times of India, March 10, 1979.
31 Foreign Affairs Record, March 1979, p.72.
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That Soviet and Indian perspectives were not identical
was borne out during Mr Desai's June 1979 visit to Moscow;
just a month prior to the fall of his government. Although
the Soviets warned of the danger that Chinese actions created
for Asian countries Mr Desai defended India's dialogue with
China on the basis of the need for peaceful settlement of
32disputes and reduction of tensions. In the final communique
China was not mentioned at all indicating once again that
India and the Soviet Union could not come to an agreement
33on the subject.
(d) Recognition of Kampuchea
The overthrow of Pol Pot and the installation of the 
Vietnam-backed Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea received 
Soviet recognition and ethusiastic support. During his
visit to Delhi Kosygin reportedly made strenuous efforts
. . . . 34to obtain Indian recognition of the new regime in Kampuchea.
While India expressed outreage at the atrocities of the Pol
Pot government it did not follow the Soviet line and extend
recognition to the Heng Samrin regime. The Indian position
was that it was willing to recognise the new government once
it was satisfied that the Heng Samrin regime was in effective
35control of the country. The silence of the final communique
32 . .ibid., June 1979, p.120.
33 ibid., pp.122-124.
34 Times of India, March 16, 1979.
35 ibid., March 17, 1979.
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on this issue indicated that agreement could not be reached. 
That the differences continued throughout the rest of the 
Janata period was testified by the lack of mention of
Kampuchea in the Joint Declaration after Mr Desai's last
. . 37visit to Moscow.
(e) Change of Government and Indo-Soviet Relations
The internal bickerings in the Janata party resulted 
in the fall of Mr Desai's government in mid-July 1979.
The new government led by Mr Charan Singh failed to win a 
vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha. The House was dissolved 
and Mr Charan Singh was asked to continue as a caretaker 
Prime Minister until the elections. Once elections were 
scheduled for early 1980, foreign policy assumed low priority. 
Nevertheless there was no change in Indo-Soviet relations.
The lack of Indian responsiveness to Soviet needs was 
maintained. The Indian performance at the Sixth Non Aligned 
Conference in Havana in early September confirms this. At 
the conference concerted efforts were made by a group of 
'radical' states to gain acceptance of the thesis that the 
Soviet Union was the 'natural ally' of the non-aligned and 
therefore the thrust of the movement had to be exclusively 
anti-Western. Cuba was at the forefront of those that advocate' 
this line. India was one of the opponents of this thesis 
and was successful in preventing the acceptance of the 
'natural ally' thesis.
3 6 Foreign Affairs Record, March 1979, pp.69-73.
37 ibid., June 1979, pp.122-124.
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On the economic front while the close and by no means 
inconsiderable links were maintained, the general trend 
(highlighted earlier) of lack of qualitative deepening of 
Indo-Soviet economic ties either largely continued or was 
enhanced further.
II
(a) Trade and Aid
While annual trade turnover increased,Indo-Soviet trade 
was still less than India's trade with USA and the EEC 
countries. Moreover the Soviet share of India's imports 
and exports remained fairly stagnant. The following tables 
highlight these two points.
Table One: India's Annual Trade with USA, USSR and EEC
(in thousand US Dollars)
1977 1978 > 1979
USA 1,543,122 1,727,242 1,754,303
USSR 877,182 790,110 1,111,403
EEC 3,136,202 3,753,822 4,223,576
Source: Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics (UN, New York, 1981).
When the Indian Prime Minister Desai visited Moscow in
October 1977, the two sides in a bid to increase their
trade decided to look into the possibilities for
production cooperation on a compensation basis,
3 8conversion deals and joint ventures. This would
Pravda, October 27, 1977.
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have resulted in further interlocking of the two economies 
and consequently in further Indian dependence.
Contrary to the publicity such proposals received, 
the progress in these areas was tardy due to differences 
in perceptions. The Soviet Union sought to utilize the 
opportunity created by production cooperation to push more 
of its machinery and equipment but India wanted to utilize 
the opportunity to exploit the unutilized capacity in its 
industries, especially the Soviet aided ones. Conversion 
deals received a jolt when the USSR tried to dump its 
surplus cotton at a time when India had a bumper harvest. 
Finally, the promise of joint ventures had not yet been 
put into practice by the end of the Janata era.
This Indian reluctance to sacrifice its interests was 
further highlighted in two other cases. First, the Soviet 
Union had in 1976 signed an agreement with Mrs Gandhi's 
government to supply 200 tons of heavy water, 50 tons of
which were supplied immediately without any formal safeguards
39 . . . .agreement. In 1977 the Soviets began insisting on
comprehensive safeguards. After negotiations India agreed
in 19 7 8 to partial safeguards under International Atomic
40 . .Energy Agency inspection. This was similar to the agreement
India had for its Tarapur plant. Early in 1979, however,
it became known that India had decided not to make use of
39 Gloria Duffy, 'Soviet Nuclear Exports', International 
Security, Summer 1978, p.97.
40 R.H. Donaldson, op.cit., p.57.
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Soviet heavy water. Thus the Soviets encountered the 
same extremely sensitive nationalism that the US had run 
into. In fact the declining of the Soviet offer meant that 
India was not even willing to go to the extent it had gone 
in accommodating the US by accepting LEU under partial 
safeguards.
Second, the Janata was as resolute in its opposition
to the Soviet move to revise the rupee-ruble exchange rate
as Mrs Gandhi's government had been earlier. After
protracted and acrimonious negotiations agreement was
reached, at the beginning of 1979, to continue using the
old exchange rate on already existing indebtedness but
employ a revised rate of exchange for new debts incurred
42by India. While it is apparent that both compromised
their earlier position it appears that the Soviets gave more.
It was highly unlikely that India would in the near
future incur fresh debts from the USSR. Prior to the Janata
coming into office the last Soviet loan had been in 1966 but
by early 1977 the balance of unutilised loans was Rs.2,551.8
43million. The rate of utilization had been so slow that
it would take another ten years to use the credits provided
44up to 1966. In this context it needs to be mentioned that
41 . . .R.C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations, p.170.
42 R.H. Donaldson, op.cit., p.55.
43 S.S. Aiyer, 'No Projects m  Sight for Using Soviet Loan', 
Times of India, June 6, 1977.
41
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in March 1977 the Soviet Union had extended a new loan of 
250 million roubles, thus further increasing the amount of 
unutilised Soviet credits.
The details of the loan had been worked out while 
Mrs Gandhi was Prime Minister. It was sought primarily 
for expansion of the Bokaro steel plant and also for the 
development of Singrauli and Raniganj coal mines. However, 
the Janata government decided to fabricate all the equipment 
for Bokaro indigenously and not to go in for Soviet assistance 
for the expansion. Thus .the main rationale for the loan 
had disappeared.
As a political gesture it was mutually agreed to use 
the loan for any other projects decided upon by the two 
governments. But as the Janata had decided to shift its 
investment priorities away from heavy industry and towards 
agriculture and small scale industries the prospects of 
utilising the new loan or going in for fresh loans had become 
more remote than ever before.
(b) Winds of Change in the Public Sector
A major development during the Janata era that needs 
to be highlighted was the large scale switch over to Western 
technology by public sector undertakings, most of which 
ad been set up partly or wholly with Soviet know-how. But, 
diie to the Janata' s predisposition for acquiring the best 
available technology (in most cases this meant Western 
technology) and the considerable improvement in the foreign
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exchange reserves several public sector projects opted for non- 
Soviet sources of know-how in their expansion and 
diversification programs.
The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) was created 
and run for more than a decade with Soviet assistance.
This proved inadequate for offshore exploration, so the ONGC 
opted for American and French expertise. Later even for
45its onshore program it sought US and Hungarian assistance.
The Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (BHEL) had used Soviet 
collaboration for manufacturing 200 MW turbogenerators 
but was unable to find markets for them. It therefore 
switched over to West German collaboration for its 500 MW 
sets.4^
The Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation signed 
five new collaboration agreements, none of which was with 
the USSR.47
The Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd (IDPL) had 
been set up with Soviet help. The production of drugs by 
the IDPL was nowhere near its licensed capacities and some 
drugs were not produced at all. The main reason for the 
dismal performance was the inherent defects of the equipment. 
These defects caused lower efficiencies, higher time cycles 
and a very high rejection rate. The IDPL entered into
45 5.5. Aiyer, 'Soviet Aided Projects: Switchover to Western 
Technology', Times of India, April 29, 1978.
46 Jayashekar, Economic Links, Seminar, September 1981, p.24.
47 5.5. Aiyer, op.cit.
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collaboration with Formafin of Italy in order to achieve
48higher yields per lower consumption of raw material.
However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the state of 
affairs. In several fields such as metallurgy, mineral 
exploration, heavy engineering India continued to use Soviet 
expertise. The fourth session of the Joint Commission in 
February-March 1978 led to the signing of a long-term
protocol for the expansion of economic, trade, technical
. . . 49 . .and scientific collaboration. More specifically agreements
were reached to provide Soviet assistance to set up a steel
plant‘d  and an alumina plant in Andhra Pradesh; and a
troposcatter link between the two countries for reliable
telecommunication.
Thus Soviet technology was by no means thrown overboard
by India. But certainly the overwhelming dependence on Soviet
technology because of the special climate of the 1950s and
1960s was sought to be rectified.
Ill
The arms procurements of the Janata regime provide 
the most compelling evidence of a reduction in the intensity 
of the Indo-Soviet relationship. It has been observed 
earlier that the major part of Indian military purchases
Jayashekar, op.cit., p.24.
49 Foreign Affairs Record, March 1978, p.158.
50 . .ibid., December 1978, p.366.
51 • • • j ibid.
ibid., April 1977, p.72.
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since the mid sixties was of Soviet origin. The Janata
endeavoured to alter this asymmetry by further diversification.
The acquisition of a deep penetration strike aircraft
to replace the Indian Air Force's (IAF) aging Canberras
and Hunters became a major priority in the late seventies.
The alternatives considered were the Soviet MiG-2 3, the
Anglo-French Jaguar, the Swedish SAAB-37 Viggen and the
53French F-l Mirage. Initially, the Janata government chose
to ignore the Soviet offer and narrowed the choice down to
54the Western aircrafts. The official explanation was that
55the Soviet aircraft did not meet the technical requirements.
But there is not much evidence to indicate that the IAF 
endorsed this view. According to a well informed Indian 
defence analyst 'the MiG-2 3 was perceived by some Air Force 
technical experts, Defence Ministry officials ... as the 
most suitable plane to succeed the aging British Hunter 
fighters and Canberra bombers'
While the relative merits of the British, French and 
Swedish aircrafts were being debated the Soviets made a 
renewed bid to get India to opt for the Soviet aircraft.
In March 1978 Air Chief Marshal Kutakhov visited India. A 
few days later there were press reports that following a 
fresh Soviet offer for an improved version the government
53 Raju G.C. Thomas, 'Aircraft for the Indian Airforce: The 
Context and Implications of the Jaguar Decision', Orbis,
Spring 1980, p.85.
54 Times of India, February 10, 1978.
Raju G.C. Thomas, op.cit., p.93.56
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was reconsidering the MiG-23. Soviet handouts circulated
in New Delhi reviewed the merits of the MiG-2 3 comparing
it with the Western aircraft. The Soviet plane was projected
to cost Rs.25 million apiece against an average of Rs.80
58million for each of the Western planes. Besides, the
cost could be paid through Indian exports and in non-
convertible rupees. Nonetheless the Janata did not change
its position and continued to arguecthat the MiG-2 3 did not
meet the combat needs of the IAF.
In October 1978, it was finally announced that India
59had opted for the Jaguar. The cost of the agreement to 
purchase outright 40 aircraft and for licensed production 
of 110 more was estimated at approximately $2.5 billion,^ 
the biggest defence contract that India had ever entered 
into. The enormity of the purchase can be understood 
by the fact that from 1967 to 1976 Indian purchases from 
the Soviet Union had totalled only $1,365 billion.^
Though enormous this was not an isolated instance of 
diversification. Soon after the Jaguar deal was made public 
the Defence Minister Mr Jagjivan Ram announced that the 
navy was to acquire British V/STOL Sea Harriers for the
57 Raju G.C. Thomas, 'Indian Defence Policy: Continuity and 
Change under the Janata Government', Pacific Affairs, Summer 
1980, pp.241-242.
5 8 Raju G.C. Thomas, Orbis, op.cit., p.94.
59 Times of India, October 7, 1978.
6 0 Raju Thomas, Orbis, op.cit., p.85.
^  World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-76 
(US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1978), p.158.
57
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aircraft carrier Vikrant. Simultaneously it was also
indicated that India was looking for submarines in the
6 3Western market. This was in contrast to the almost
exclusive-naval cooperation with the Soviet Union in the
64late sixties and early seventies.
The army continued to be self-reliant with the minimum 
requirements for external purchases. Only the equipment 
needs of the Army's two armoured divisions and some armoured 
brigades required such items as import of tanks, anti-tank 
devices and some artillery pieces. Even in this there seemed 
to be some interest in acquiring Western equipment.
Contrary to widely circulated reports that India had placed 
an order for Soviet T-72 tanks the Defence Minister made 
it clear that a final decision had not been made. The 
West German Leopard and a modified version of the British 
Chieftain were reported to be under consideration.^ When 
the Desai government fell a decision had yet to be made.
Notwithstanding the conclusion of major agreements 
with Britain, and an increased interest in Western technology 
in general, acquisitions from the USSR continued. Some 
significant, although not major, purchases were made. They 
included 11-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, Ka-25 and 
Mi-8 helicopters and SA-3 surface to air missiles.^
6 2 The Overseas Hindustan Times, October 26, 1978.
6 3 ibid.
64 . . .For naval acquisitions under Mrs Gandhi's government see
Raju G.C. Thomas, 'The Indian Navy in the Seventies', Pacific
Affairs, Winter 1974-75 , pp.500-518.'
The Overseas Hindustan Times, June 21, 19 79 .
World Armaments and Disarmaments SIPRI Year Books, 1978 
and 1979.
6 2
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Thus in the sphere of arms acquisitions, as in the 
economic sphere, the Janata maintained the ties with the 
USSR but endeavoured to reduce Indian dependence on it.
IV
In summary, it could be said that while the Janata's 
policy modifications did not radically alter India's relations 
with the Soviet Union, unlike the 'about turn' in Egypt's 
relations with the USSR under President Sadat, nonetheless 
the overall impact of the sum total of changes of style, 
substance, emphasis and content was a dimunition of India's 
Soviet connection.
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CHAPTER V 
'NORMALCY RESTORED'
The turmoil that had characterised India's domestic 
politics in the latter half of 1979 ended with Mrs Gandhi's 
overwhelming electoral success in January 1980. The Congress 
(Indira) won a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha.
Mrs Gandhi was now re-established in almost as strong a 
position as in 1971. On the international front super power 
relations had towards the end of 1979 deteriorated into 
what some observers had begun to cAll the 'new cold war'.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the super power 
naval buildup in the Indian Ocean transformed India's vicinity 
into an arena of potential super power confrontation. This 
chapter examines Indo-Soviet relations, in this changed 
environment, from January 19 80 to August 19 81, the end of 
the first decade of the treaty relationship.
I
In comparison with the general state of relations during 
the Janata era this period witnessed an increase in the 
degree of closeness of the bilateral relationship. A 
variety of disparate but significant indications underscore 
this observation.
The Soviet leaders made their happiness about Mrs Gandhi's 
return to power obvious, praising her 'personal contribution' 
to the expansion and deepening of Soviet-Indian relations'^
 ^ Soviet Review, January 17, 1980.
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and declaring 'we have always had a particular liking for 
2Mrs Gandhi'. Communiques released at the conclusion of 
high-level contacts between Indian and Soviet leaders 
stressed the atmosphere of 'mutual trust and cordiality' 
or 'friendship and trust' that prevailed during the
3discussions. As has been pointed out earlier the term 
'trust' had been conspicuously absent from the communiques 
during the Janata interregnum and had last been used during 
Mrs Gandhi's Moscow visit in 1976.
Again, the Joint Declaration after President Brezhnev's 
December 1980 visit stated that 'special significance is 
attached by the two sides to Indo-Soviet meetings and contacts
4at the highest level'. This was remarkably similar to the
1976 Declaration which also highlighted the 'special
5importance of meetings at the highest level'. The Joint 
Declarations in the Janata period were silent on the 
'importance' and 'significance' of high-level contacts.
Finally, in the December 1980 communique the two sides 
expressed 'profound satisfaction' at the state of the 
relationship.^ This was akin to the 'deep satisfaction' 
and 'profound satisfaction' expressed during Mr Brezhnev's 
1973 visit and Mrs Gandhi's visit in 1976. The practice in
7the Janata period was to merely express 'satisfaction'.
2 Foreign Affairs Record, December 1980, p.284.
3 . .For example see ibid., February 1980, p.47 and also December
1980, p.298.
4 . .ibid., p.301.
5 ibid.
 ^ ibid., p .301.
7 See Chapter IV.
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This does not mean that the relationship had reverted 
to the level of closeness of Mrs Gandhi's earlier stay in 
office. The dimunition of the role of the treaty in the 
bilateral relationship that the Janata government had 
introduced by specifying that relations would be strengthened 
in the 'spirit of the treaty' instead of the Soviet prefered 
'on the basis of the treaty' was maintained by Mrs Gandhi's 
government.®
According to the reports in usually well-informed quarters 
Soviet delegations were kept waiting in New Delhi for days 
before the previously accessible Indian Prime Minister
9finally met them.
More significantly the references to India in the
General Secretary's reports to the CPSU Congresses have
usually provided a good indication of the state of Soviet-
Indian relations. In 19 76 Brezhnev's report to the Twenty
Fifth CPSU Congress had praised India in unprecedented
terms, thus indicating the intensity of the bilateral
relationship. In contrast the references to India in
Brezhnev's report to the Twenty Sixth CPSU Congress were
briefer and less enthusiastic, signalling that relations,
although important, were not back to the level of the earlier
10years.
Q See Chapter IV.
9 Foreign Report (London), 'Mrs Gandhi and the Russians', 
December 17, 1981, p.l.
^  See Pravda,
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Probably the most significant indicator of the Indian 
desire not to be too burdened with Soviet friendship was 
provided by Mrs Gandhi turning down Soviet suggestions to 
celebrate the tenth anniversary on a grand scale.^ Her 
'message of greetings' was a minimal acknowledgement of the 
event.
What all this points to is that while there was in 
general an increase in the degree of closeness the level of 
intensity that marked Indo-Soviet relations from 1972 to 
early 1977 was not fully restored.
Having made this broad assessment it remains to be 
seen what impact this increase in the degree of closeness 
had on Indian attitudes towards specific issues that impinged 
on Indo-Soviet relations. The rest of this section is devoted 
to such an analysis.
(a) India and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
The events leading to the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan in December 1979 are too well documented to
12need resurrection here. The concern here is to analyse 
Indian reaction to the Soviet move. The Soviet intervention 
posed a serious dilemma for Indian decision makers. Given 
its consistent opposition to super power intervention in
1] Foreign Report, op.cit.,
12 . .For example, see J i n  Valenta, 'The Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan: The Difficulty of Knowing Where to Stop',
Orbis, Summer 1980, pp.201-218.
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the Third World India could hardly have looked upon the 
Soviet action favourably, whatever its interpretation of 
the events leading to the intervention. On the other hand, 
the US and Chinese responses to the Soviet action affected 
Indian interests in a way that the Soviet move did not. 
Pakistan was elevated to the status of a 'front line' state 
by the US and the arms embargo to it was lifted. Similarly 
China too promised military assistance.
For the USA and China as well as for most other states 
Afghanistan was a global issue of blatant Soviet invasion 
but for India it gained regional importance. The US and 
Chinese pledge of supplying arms to Pakistan was viewed by 
India as threatening its security, since in the past Western 
arms had been used in Pakistan's wars with India. Thus there 
was a perceptible increase in India's perceived need for 
the countervailing support of the Soviet Union. The issue 
of a rearmed Pakistan became of primary importance for 
India while the Soviet role in Afghanistan, since it did 
not directly affect Indian security perceptions became 
secondary. Nevertheless India could not ignore the invasion 
of a non-aligned state. The Indian stance in Afghanistan 
reflected these conflicting pressures.
When the crisis first erupted India was in the throes 
of a general election, with a caretaker government in charge. 
Mr Charan Singh, as the head of the government, summoned 
the Soviet Ambassador and made it clear that in India's 
view the sending of Soviet troops would have 'far reaching 
and adverse consequences' for the region as a whole. He also
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expressed his desire that the Soviet troops be withdrawn
as soon as possible, reminding the Soviets that in June
1979 both India and the Soviet Union had expressed their
common opposition to any foreign intervention in the internal
13affairs of Afghanistan.
At the same time the other strand of the official
Indian perception that a major danger of the Afghan situation
was the likelihood of an arms race in the subcontinent was
also stressed. India's 'grave concern' at the US move to
14rearm Pakistan was conveyed to the US Ambassador. A
Foreign Ministry statement expressed the 'hope that no
country or external power would take the steps which might
15aggravate the situation'. US efforts to persuade India 
that the arms for Pakistan were intended only to contain 
Soviet intervention along Pakistan's western borders did 
not cut much ice with the Indians.
The initial actions of Mrs Gandhi's new government 
emphasised the second strand while underplaying the first. 
When the UN General Assembly debated the Afghan issue the 
Indian representative under instructions from Mrs Gandhi 
spoke in a vein extremely sympathetic of the Soviet Union.
Mr Mishra declared that India was against the presence 
of foreign troops and bases in any country but immediately 
qualified it by stating that 'India cannot look with
13 Times of India, January 1, 1980.
14 • • o ibid.
Overseas Hindustan Times, January 10 , 1980.
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equanimity on the attempts by some outside powers to interfere 
in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by training, arming 
and encouraging subversive elements to create disturbances 
inside Afghanistan'.^
His essential conclusion was:
The Soviet government has assured our 
government that its troops went to 
Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan 
government first made by President Amin 
on December 26, 1979, and then repeated 
by his successor on December 28, 1979.
And we have been further assured that 
Soviet troops will be withdrawn when 
requested to do so by the Afghan government.
We have no reason to doubt assurances, 
particularly from a friendly country like 
the Soviet Union with whom we have many 
close ties.I7
The speech momentarily shocked most UN members. Shorn 
of its veneer it was implicitly a defence of the Soviet 
position and created the impression that India was toeing 
the Soviet line. That Indian and Soviet perceptions were 
not identical soon became apparent, however, when the 
resolution calling for 'the immediate, unconditional and 
total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan' (the 
Soviet Union was not specifically mentioned) was voted upon. 
The resolution was supported by 104 countries. The Soviet 
Union was amongst the 18 who voted against it, while India 
along with 17 others abstained.
Can this be described as Soviet influence on New Delhi? 
While it is true that the Soviets attempted to persuade 
India to support their stance the Indian approach was a
16
1 7  • i • j  ibid.
Times of India, January 11, 1980.
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historically consistent one. In 1956 on Hungary and in
196 8 on Czechoslovakia, India had adopted similar approaches.
It had refused to condemn the Soviet Union on both occasions,
although Indian disapproval of the Soviet action had been
made clear both times. Another similarity in the Indian
approach was the emphasis it placed on recognising 'realities'
in such situations. In this case in Indian perception the
'realities' included external subversion in Afghanistan,
undeniable Soviet interests there and the fact of the USSR's
substantial present commitment. This points more to
similarity in Indian and Soviet views rather than Soviet
influence. To the extent they were similar the'Indian
delegate's speech echoed Soviet perceptions but since they
weren't identical the voting reflected the difference.
Nevertheless the Indians realised that their action
at the United Nations had hurt India's stature, in that
vaguest of forums, world public opinion, since it had
created the impression that India was justifying the Soviet
action. Thus Indian leaders began clarifying their position
by emphasising their opposition to the Soviet action. After
a meeting with Lord Carrington on January 16, Mrs Gandhi
made her first public statement since assuming office,
declaring that no country was justified in entering another 
18country. Soon after in an interview with Time magazine,
she went further and stated that she 'disapproved of the
19Soviet.: presence m  Afghanistan'.
18 ibid., January 197, 1980.
19 Time, January 21, 1980, p.42.
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The External Affairs Minister Mr Narasimha Rao in a
statement to the Lok Sabha said,
As the Prime Minister has clearly indicated, 
we are against the presence of foreign troops 
and bases in any country. We have expressed 
our hope that Soviet forces will withdraw 
from Afghanistan
and went on to declare that India had never endorsed the
20Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
At the same time India maintained a high profile program 
of seeking to limit the global and regional response that 
might threaten its interests. Its criticism of the US 
decision to supply arms to Pakistan continued thus 
maintaining the anti-Western aspects of the Indian stance 
on Afghanistan. The US proposal for a regional security 
arrangement conveyed to Mrs Gandhi by President Carter's 
special envoy Clark Clifford was also turned down on the 
grounds that it was bound to heighten tensions.
As the initial fears generated by the US response subsided 
and in February it became clear that the US pledge of military 
aid to Pakistan was a limited one which was not overtly 
threatening to it, Indian criticism of Pakistan and China 
grew progressively muted. More so after General Zia formally 
rejected the US offer on March 5. On the other hand, the 
differences in Indian and Soviet perceptions came into bold 
relief.
In mid-February the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
visited New Delhi. His goal undoubtedly was to obtain 
Indian support for Moscow's intervention. The reports of
20 Lok Sabha Debates (Seventh Series), January 23/198, Vol.l, 
No.3, Cl.47.
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that the controversy over Afghanistan dominated the meetings.
The talks with Gromyko were described as 'tough' and
21'chilly'. Gromyko was said to have 'explained the Soviet
point of view' while Indian leaders 'conveyed ... India's 
22assessment'. The joint atatement skirted the Afghan
23 .issue completely. This obviously signified substantial
disagreement.
The pattern was similar in all other high level visits 
in 1980. The Indian Foreign Minister Rao visited Moscow in 
June, the Indian President Reddy journeyed to Moscow in 
September and the Soviet Party General Secretary Brezhnev 
came to New Delhi in December. On all three occasions 
Afghanistan was the principal subject of discussion, and 
in every instance the communiques issued at the conclusion 
of the visits did not mention Afghanistan, thus indicating 
that the differences in attitudes persisted throughout 1980.
19 81 saw a new President take over in Washington. The 
initial actions of the Reagan Administration were seen 
in India as detrimental to its interests. President Reagan 
indicated that he would consider any request for weapons 
from Afghan 'freedom fighters'. Also the new administration 
began discussions with Pakistan on the resumption of large- 
scale military aid. Predictably this drew an adverse reaction 
from India, and the anti-Western strand once again surfaced.
21 New York Times, February 13, 1980.
22 Times of India, February 12, 1980.
the discussions that he had with Indian leaders indicate
23 Pravda, February 15, 1980.
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Ministers' Conference was held in New Delhi in mid-February.
The Soviets had done a great deal of lobbying with New Delhi
While their optimum goal was to get India to change its
position, at a minimum they wished to keep India from
drifting further from the Soviet stance.
Initially the Soviet pressure seemed to be yielding
dividends. India as the host country had prepared the
draft declaration. The Indian draft was an overt attempt
to shield criticism of the Soviet move into Afghanistan.
It did not refer to foreign intervention at all but merely
stated the need to de-escalate tensions and seek a political
solution. Several non-aligned states took exception to the
24'toothless draft' and sought to amend it.
Whatever influence the Soviet Union had exerted on
India proved to be momentary. In the face of a general
consensus for a stronger indictment of the Soviet action
India backtracked. In fact it did not even lobby for the
acceptance of the original draft as Cuba, Vietnam and
Afghanistan did. The final declaration called for a
settlement on the basis of withdrawal of foreign troops
and observance of the principles of non-intervention and
25non-interference. The formulation was viewed as
24 See Mohan Ram, 'The Draft With No Teeth', Far Eastern 
Economic Review (hereafter referred to as FEER), February 13
1981, p.10.
25
It was in this atmosphere that the non-aligned Foreign
Times of India, February 14, 1981.
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unfavourable to the Soviet Union both in the West and in 
2 6India. That India was party to it expresses the divergence
in Indian and Soviet perceptions.
In the months after the non-aligned meeting, as it
became evident that the US was planning to supply arms to
Pakistan on a massive scale, the anti-Western aspects of
the Indian posture were once again accentuated. The
differences between India and the West were clearly displayed
during Mrs Thatcher's visit in April 1981. Yet this did
not mean a reduction in the distance that separated Indian
and Soviet views. The statement released at the conclusion
of Foreign Minister Rao's annual trek to Moscow in July
27was once again silent on the Afghanistan issue.
In essence, as one commentator has noted, the Indian
stance 'wandered' between total support of the Soviet action
and complete indictment of it, the two scenarios many
28had predicted. At times India had stressed the anti- 
Western aspects of its stance but it had consistently 
expressed its desire for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, 
although this was largely low key.
(b) Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean
As part of the US response to the unstable international 
situation in the late seventies President Carter had reversed
2 6 For example see ibid. and New York Times, February 14, 19 81.
27 Overseas Hindustan Times, July 30, 1981.
2 8 R.C. Horn, 'Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence 
Relationship', Asian Survey, March 1983, p.257.
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his March 1977 pledge of demilitarisation of the Indian 
Ocean and had increased the US presence there, until by 
December 1979 the US flotilla was larger than ever before.
The Afghan invasion became the justification for a further 
buildup.
According to one source the number of US ships grew
from about 24 at the beginning of 1980 to more than 40 by 
29September. Meanwhile the Soviet naval presence m  the
30region had increased from 24 to 32 in the same period.
The Soviet Union nonetheless sought to highlight the 
'imperialist threat in the Indian Ocean' and attempted to 
ignore its own buildup.3 "^
The Indians were hardly taken in by this Soviet strategy. 
During Brezhnev's visit President Reddy expressed India's 
strong disapproval of the 'upward spiral of competitive
32naval presence of non-littoral states in the Indian Ocean'.
Mrs Gandhi's concern over the increased naval strength of
33external powers was also made clear to the Soviets. The
differing perceptions of the two on the Indian Ocean issue -
Moscow's of a US buildup and New Delhi's of increase in
the strength of non-littoral states - was further indicated
by the restrained Indian response to Brezhnev's five point
34proposal for peace and security in the Persian Gulf.
29 R.C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations, p.198.
30 ibid.
31 See International Affairs, June 1980, p.103.
32 Foreign Affairs Record, December 1980, p.285.
33 Times of India, December 10, 1980.
34 Mrs Gandhi's reaction was 'it appeared to be a constructive 
suggestion and was worthy of careful consideration, Overseas 
Hindustan Times, December 25, 1980.
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The Joint Declaration was ambiguous enough for each side
to interpret it to suit its own position. Diego Garcia
was specifically mentioned as an example of a base that
needed to be removed. This was followed by a condemnation
of 'any attempts to build up foreign military presence in
35the Indian Ocean under any pretext whatsoever'.
At the non-aligned Foreign Ministers' meeting New Delhi
shifted its stance expressed during Brezhnev's visit just
a couple of months before. Its draft attempted to de-emphasise
the notions of super power rivalry by focussing on US
presence in Diego Garcia while ignoring Soviet presence in
3 6the Indian Ocean. This move was frustrated by dissenters,
who demanded that the declaration either name both Soviet
and US bases or none at all. Once again India backtracked
and agreed to abide by the majority decision. The Delhi
Declaration did not specifically mention any base but
voiced an omnibus disapproval of big power rivalry in the
37region m  all forms and manifestations. This once again 
reveals the momentary nature of Soviet influence.
(c) The China Factor in Indo-Soviet Relations
China's response to the Soviet invasion further worsened 
its already tenuous relations with the Soviet Union and India. 
While it was China's vociferous denunciation of the Soviet
35 Pravda, December 12, 1980.
3 6 See Mohan Ram, op.cit.
37 Times of India, February 14, 1981.
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action that escalated the tension between China and the 
USSR in the case of Sino-Indian relations,it was the Sino-US 
decision, in early January 1980, to increase military aid 
to Pakistan that generated fears in India of a Sino-US- 
Pakistan axis.
Sino-Soviet relations showed little improvement in the 
period under review but Sino-Indian relations began to 
rebound almost immediately after the initial downturn.
The early signals for better relations were provided by 
China. For the first time in twenty years the Chinese 
Foreign Minister attended India's Republic Day celebrations 
at Beijing on 26 January 1980. China sent a new Ambassador 
to India after Mrs Gandhi took over without waiting for 
India's replacement to arrive in Beijing. Further evidence 
of China's desire for better relations with India was 
provided during Pakistani President General Zia's visit 
to Beijing. The Chinese refused to be drawn on the Kashmir
38issue despite General Zia raising the theme in his speeches. 
For its part India too realised that the Chinese response 
to Afghanistan, of military aid to Pakistan was more measured 
than New Delhi had anticipated. Once the misapprehensions 
were allayed India too expressed cautious optimism towards 
establishing better relations.
Mrs Gandhi met the Chinese Foreign Minister at Salisbury 
in April and Chairman Hua Kuo Feng at Tito's funeral in May.
o p FEER, May 16, 1980.
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The Belgrade meeting was the first contact at that level
since the Chou-Nehru parleys two decades earlier. The
Chinese leader apparently told Mrs Gandhi that his country
was 'more than ready' to improve relations. The Indian
Prime Minister too reciprocated such sentiments saying India
was also anxious to do the same. In effect the two leaders
agreed that better Sino-Indian relations were essential
39to promote peace m  Asia.
Soviet concern with these developments was obvious.
The Soviet press warned with new intensity the threat
to India of a Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis. Against
the background of General Zia's visit to Beijing a Tass
commentary stressed that the 'close alliance between the
Beijing chauvinists and the Pakistani military dictatorship'
was not only a threat to Afghanistan but 'it was well known
that the Chinese-Pakistan rapprochement had above all an
40anti-Indian thrust'. Various other Soviet press reports 
emphasised the strategic dangers to India of the Karakoram 
Highway, China's threat to Asian security and Sino-Pakistani 
nuclear cooperation.4^
Inthe face of this barrage of Soviet warnings the 
Foreign Minister Rao assured the Soviet Union that 
normalisation of relations with China would not be at the
39 Times of India, May 10, 1980.
40 See Times of India, May 11, 1980.
41 For example see Pravda, May 26, 1980; Pravda, August 7,
1980 and New Times, No.21, May 1980.
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cost of Indo-Soviet friendship. At the same time there
was no letup in furthering the process of normalisation of
Sino-Indian relations. A high level delegation led by
Mr Eric Gonsalves, Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, was
sent to Beijing in June.
The visit enhanced the prospects for better relations.
At a banquet in Mr Gonsalves' honour the Chinese Vice-Minister
for Foreign Affairs declared that China was 'willing to
further improve its relations with India on the basis of
43the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'.
More importantly, while Gonsalves was in Beijing,
Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-ping in an interview with an Indian
defence journal called for improved relations. He also
underscored this Chinese desire by making two concessions.
First, he stated that Kashmir was a bilateral problem
between India and Pakistan and should be settled amicably.
This was an implicit confirmation of the shift in overt
Chinese support for Pakistan's goal of 'self-determination'
in Kashmir. Second, he renewed the 'package' offer, to
solve the border problem (Chou had first proposed this prior
to the 1962 war), suggesting that China would give up its
claims of territory beyond the McMahon line in North-East
India if India agreed to the status quo in Aksai Chin along
44the Kashmir border. While this was hardly what India
42 Times of India, May 17, 1980.
43 . .Beming Review, May 12, 1980.
44
42
Times of India, June 23, 1980.
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wanted as a final solution New Delhi welcomed it as a
45starting point for negotiations.
Whatever little optimism had been generated by the 
Gonsalves visit was shortlived. Little more than a month 
later further progress was 'frozen' by the Indian recognition 
of the Heng Samrin regime of Democratic Kampuchea and the 
consequent postponement of the Chinese Foreign Minister's 
visit to India. This once again brought to the fore the 
tenuous nature of progress in Sino-Indian normalisation 
efforts. Obviously Moscow viewed it with relief.
After a period of inactivity once again there were
growing signs of progress in Sino-Indian relations. In
April 1981 Deng told the visiting Janata leader,
Dr Subramaniam Swamy, that the first item on China's agenda
46was normalisation of relations with India. In May it was 
announced that the long-postponed visit to New Delhi of 
the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua would take place in 
June.
Once again the Soviet press launched a campaign to 
remind India of the dangers that China posed to it. China's 
occupation of 'sacred Indian land', Beijing's support for 
secessionist movements in India, its strategic linkages with 
Pakistan and the imperialist powers, and the 'truth' behind 
China's 'false diplomacy of smiles' towards India were
ibid., July 3, 1980.
Overseas Hindustan Times, April 23, 1981.46
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highlighted. As Huang Hua's visit drew nearer the bluntness 
of such warnings increased once again indicating that the 
Soviet Union did not regard Sino-Indian normalisation 
favourably.
During the Huang Hua visit the two countries succeeded 
in making a fresh start on the border negotiations so that 
the larger aspects of bilateral relations could be spared 
the dispute's debilitating impact, thus signalling that 
both sides were keen to renew relations which had remained 
dormant for more than two decades.
The above discussion does not indicate that there was 
a major reconciliation between India and China which affected 
India's relations with the Soviet Union. Such a development 
was probably years away. However it does suggest that 
India was willing to brook Soviet disapproval in order to 
enhance its diplomatic manoeuvrability. In short Indian 
attitudes towards China are yet another instance of India's 
unwillingness to subjugate its interests to Soviet desires.
(d) Indian Recognition of Kampuchea
On 7 July 1980 India recognised the Heng Samrin-led 
government of the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea. The move 
was clearly one that worked in favour of the Soviet Union.
It was a gain for Soviet supported Vietnam in its continuing 
contest with China. The adverse affect this had on Sino-Indian
47
47 For example see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts SU/G715/A3/3; 
SU/6730/A3/2; SU/6 738/A3/1; SU/6 739/A3/2; SU/6759/A3/2.
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relations has been noted earlier. Most Western newspaper"
reports regarded it as a clear case of India accommodating
48Soviet interests. Does the record support such an 
assessment?
While it is true that the Indian recognition was in
Soviet interests there is no evidence to suggest that the
decision was one that was adopted under Soviet influence.
The closest contact between India and the Soviet Union
prior to the Indian recognition was during Foreign Minister
Rao's trip to Moscow in June. The fairly extensive record
of Rao1s discussions provides no indication of Kampuchea
being a major issue and there was no hint of unusual Soviet
pressure on India or Indian policy change.
On the other side of the coin there is some evidence
of India arriving at the decision independently. The
Congress (I) election manifesto released in December 1979
had made a clear commitment to recognise the Heng Samrin
49regime if the party were elected. Thus Mrs Gandhi could 
not have gone back on it unless some dramatic development 
obliged a review of the promise. In May during the meeting 
of the Consultative Committee of Parliament for Foreign 
Affairs there was a general consensus among all members 
(including those from the opposition) that the Heng Samrin
48 For example see'India's Gesture to Moscow', The Times 
(London), July 9, 1980.
49 See C.P. B h a m b h n , Lok Sabha Elections, January 19 80, 
'Ideas on Foreign Policy in the Election Manifestoes', 
International Studies, April-June 1980, p.246.
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government should be recognised. The Foreign Minister
assured the committee that the recognition would be granted
50as soon as possible. Finally, India's close relations 
with Vietnam are a matter of record. Thus the available 
evidence points more to India independently reaching the 
decision and less to such a decision having been adopted 
under Soviet pressure.
The above survey of Indian and Soviet attitudes 
indicates that despite the increase in the degree of 
closeness of the bilateral relationship there were 
significant differences between the two countries on most 
issues. There was very little evidence of India adopting 
foreign policy postures simply to accommodate Soviet 
interests. While at times India had under pressure shifted 
its stance closer to that of the Soviet Union such shifts 
were momentary indicating Indian unwillingness to make 
major sacrifices in order to facilitate Soviet objectives.
II
While the political arena witnessed a slight increase 
in the closeness of the bilateral relationship in the 
economic sphere, there was no significant deepening of 
economic dependence, although the beneficial linkages 
continued to be significant.
During Mr Brezhnev's visit an agreement was signed 
pledging Soviet assistance to a broad range of projects
50 Times of India, May 17, 1980.
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to be covered during India's Sixth Five Year Plan.^^ In
January 1981 during the session of Inter-Governmental
Commission it was decided to establish a Joint Commission
52m  such areas as coal and energy. Such agreements did
not enhance but rather continued economic cooperation.
The annual trade turnover rose from Rs 14.6 3 billion
53m  1979-80 to Rs 21.3 billion m  1980-81. This howevre 
did not mark a radical increase in Soviet share of India's 
overall trade. The relative Soviet position continued 
to be third behind the EEC and the US.
Table One: India's Trade with USSR, USA and EEC
(in percentage)
USSR USA EEC (ten)
1979-80 9.4 11.2 25.3
1980-81 11.0 12.3 21.9 
Source: Economic Survey, 1981-82
The increase in overall trade was largely because of 
the expansion in Soviet imports from India rather than 
Soviet exports to India. Acute foreign exchange shortage 
to pay for imports from the West led the Soviet Union to 
shop for consumer goods from India's duty-free export
51 . .ibid., December 11, 1980.
52 . .ibid., January 28, 1981.
53 Economic Survey, 1981-82, p.135
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promotion zones. Soviet imports from India increased by
Rs 5.19 billion while exports to India increased only by
54about a fourth of this value, Rs 1.3 billion. Even 
this rise in the value of Indian imports was almost entirely 
due to increase in the quantity as well as the cost of 
crude oil and petroleum products. But this was hardly 
enough to offset the increase in Soviet imports. Thus 
the Rs 1.86 billion trade deficit in 1979-80 was transformed 
into a Rs 2.02 billion surplus in India's favour by
1980-81.55
Such a development was hardly to the liking of the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet desire to get India to import 
more was apparent. In trade negotiations Soviet officials 
attempted to put pressure on their Indian counterparts 
to buy more. The Soviet Union initiated discussions to 
collaborate with India in the setting up of a steel plant 
in Nigeria and a nuclear plant in L i b y a . F i n a l l y  the Spviets
offered to extend the sphere of collaboration to private
57industry so as to enhance exports to India. However, 
by the end of the period under review the Soviets had not 
achieved any success.
Ill
The enhanced perception of threat to its security 
prompted substantial military purchases by India to meet
54 . .D ibid.
55 . . ibid.
Times of India, February 24, 1980. 
ibid., February 21, 1981.
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perceived needs. In May 1980 the Soviet Union extended
5 8a $1.6 billion credit to the purchase period. The
terms were extremely favourable with 2.5% annual interest
59and repayment over 17 years. The equipment India was to
purchase included T-72 tanks, MiG-23 fighter aircraft,
MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft, anti-tank missiles, air
to air and air to surface missiles. ®
Significant deals were made with Western countries too.
Two West German HDW-1500 submarines were purchased outright
at a cost of about Rs 500 million each and two more were
61to be built in India under license. Mrs Gandhi reapproved
in 1980 the order held in abeyance since 1976 to purchase
two Boeing 737-200C transport aircraft from the USA.
Also, as part of a $340 million deal with the US more than
200 self-propelled howitzers and about 3,700 BGM-71 Tow
6 2anti-tank missiles were acquired. Finally, in order to
counter Pakistan's acquisition of F-16 aircrafts negotiations
were at an advanced stage to purchase Mirage-2000 fighter/
6 3strike aircraft from France.
5 8 International Herald Tribune, May 28, 1980.
59 ibid.
^  World Armaments and Disarmaments, SIPRI Yearbook, 1981.
^  The Indian Express, July 11, 1980.
6 2 World Armaments and Disarmaments, SIPRI Yearbook, 1982, 
Appendix 6B, p.214.
6 3 R.K. Gandhi, 'From Russia With Arms', Business India 
(Bombay), September 14-27, 1981, pp.51-521 the Mirage deal 
was finalised in 1982.
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Thus while Soviet weaponry continued to be the 
mainstay of Indian defence purchases the earlier pattern 
of diversification of sources of arms so as to reduce 
dependence on the USSR continued.
IV
The major themes that emerge from the above discussion 
of the political, economic and military dimensions of Indo- 
Soviet relations in this period seem to broadly conform 
with those discerned in the earlier phases of the 
relationship. While there was in general an increase in 
the level of intensity of the relationship from that existing 
in the preceding period, there was very little evidence 
that it was translated into increased economic and military 
dependence. True the asymmetry in the defence links continued 
but efforts to reduce it were also maintained with the trend 
of diversification of sources of arms acquisition being 
continued. Nevertheless in the actual diplomatic performance, 
Indian and Soviet views were far from complementary.
Indian unwillingness to subjugate its interests to those 
of the Soviet Union was as conspicuous as it was earlier.
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The theme that has surfaced persistently during the 
examination of Indo-Soviet relations in the first decade of the 
treaty relationship is that there is no evidence to support 
the grosser tales of enhancement of Indian dependence on and 
subservience to the Soviet Union consequent to the treaty 
of 1971.
Indeed strong economic and military ties bind India 
to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless Moscow's position in 
India's external economic interactions was neither a dominant 
one nor was its relative prominence enhanced. In fact the 
trend has been for the Soviet Union to be unable or unwilling 
to meet the needs of the changed requirements of the Indian 
economy.
In the sphere of arms trade the picture is significantly 
different. Although the signing of the treaty did not result 
in an increase in Indian reliance on Soviet arms the Soviet 
Union continued to be the major source of Indian defence 
purchases. While India's efforts to work its way to greater 
independence through expansion of its domestic defence 
industry, through diversification of its sources of supply, 
and through domestic production under foreign licence achieved 
considerable success the asymmetry remained, albeit at a 
reduced level.
Politically the partition of India's traditional rival 
Pakistan in 1971 brought a radical change in the South Asian 
balance of power and enhanced Indian dominance in the region.
CONCLUSION
127
The possibility that any major external power would again 
stake its global reputation on backing a dimunitive Pakistan 
in a confrontation with India was reduced. Consequently 
Indian reliance on Soviet support to manage sub-continental 
affairs also declined. However India still required Soviet 
support since the possibility of external support for 
Pakistan, although lessened, had not been eliminated.
Moreover, Soviet support for Indian security was necessary 
in the case of a conflict with China. On the other hand 
continuing Sino-Soviet hostility had ensured continuing 
Soviet need for Indian freindship; to a lesser extent 
Moscow also valued India as a counter to US influence.
While it is true that during the period surveyed there 
was a declining Indian need for the Soviet Union in contrast 
to the continuing (and even increasing) Soviet need for 
India, on balance it could still be argued that the Indian 
need seems to have been greater. However this did not 
result in Moscow gaining leverage of a substantial nature.
At times the Soviet Union has been able to bring about 
shifts in Indian stances. The changes that have occurred
have always been momentary. The shift during the South 
Asian crisis of 1971 from a preference for an independent 
Bangladesh to a reluctant acceptance that independence need 
not be the only solution to the turmoil lasted just more 
than a week. At the first available opportunity India reverted 
to its preferred position. Then again at the Non Aligned 
Foreign Ministers' meeting at New Delhi in 1981 the Indian
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draft sought to ignore the Soviet presence in Afghanistan 
and Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean. On both 
scores India backtracked and agreed to formulations which 
were not favourable to the Soviet Union.
On other issues a slightly different type of leverage 
has been manifested. On the question of the declaration 
of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace in the early 1970s 
although the Soviet Union was unable to change the essence 
of the Indian support for the Zone of Peace proposal, New 
Delhi at one stage accepted the validity of Soviet objections 
and Moscow was successful in channelising Indian criticism 
away from it and towards Washington. Even this was temporary. 
The Janata government as part of its 'genuine nonalignment' 
refused to accept the Soviet objections and also disapproved 
of both US and Soviet presence in the Ocean.
On a wide variety of issues India has refused to align 
its conduct with Soviet preferences where doing so would 
have involved a sacrifice of major interests. During the 
1971 crisis in South Asia the Soviet Union had consistently 
counselled restraint but its diplomacy was unable to arrest 
the drift towards war as a last resort. Similarly despite 
Moscow's approval of NPT as a regulatory regime its efforts 
to get India to subscribe to it did not succeed in altering 
the Indian position. In fact the Soviet attitude towards 
the Indian nuclear explosion was a significant instance of 
Soviet deference to Indian sensibilities.
Again, India has steered clear of becoming an instrument 
of Soviet policy against China. Although the Soviets made
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concerted efforts to win India's approval for the Asian 
Collective Security scheme there was a clear awareness in New 
Delhi that Beijing viewed the scheme as a Soviet effort to 
construct a coalition of states to contain China and therefore 
India never endorsed it. On the other hand notwithstanding 
Moscow's unremitting efforts to convince India i of the danger 
which China has represented to it New Delhi has made efforts 
to normalise Sino-Indian relations. True Sino-Indian 
normalisation is still far away and progress has been 
painstakingly slow, but this has been largely due to the 
inherent problems in Sino-Indian relations rather than Soviet 
success in dissuading India.
Also, Indo-Soviet friendship has not prevented India 
from expressing grave doubts about super power detente.
It is a matter of record that Mrs Gandhi as well as other 
Indian spokesmen criticised detente as an attempt by the 
super powers to carve out global spheres of influence at 
the expense of lesser powers.
Thus the available evidence indicates the existence 
of a very limited Soviet ability to get India to conform 
to Soviet preferences. Major policy changes have not been 
produced. Soviet leverage has operated only on the margin 
or periphery of relations.
This is not to say that Soviet economic assistance, 
the benefits of trade with Moscow, the importance of the 
Soviet Union as the principal source of arms and a factor 
in Indian security has had no impact on India. It has 
provided for a relatively stable relationship between India
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and the Soviet Union. An illustration of the value of 
such a situation for the Soviets can be seen in 1977.
When the Janata came to power all available indications 
were that Indo-Soviet relations would undergo drastic 
changes. Given the problems that the Soviets were then 
encountering in their relatins with Egypt a setback in 
India would have underscored their diplomatic isolation 
in the Third World. Egypt and India are two countries in 
which the Soviets have invested a considerable amount of 
resources over a long period of time. After Sadat's move 
away from Moscow a repeat performance in India would have 
compounded the Soviet problems among the developing states.
Despite the predispositions the Janata leaders realised 
the substantial benefits accruing to India from relations 
with the Soviet Union. Therefore while they introduced 
changes which resulted in a dimunition of India's Soviet 
connection these changes took place within the broad 
framework of continuity of close relations. Thus the Indian 
need for Soviet economic and military assistance has provided 
New Delhi with an incentive for avoiding sharp discontinuities 
in its relationship with Moscow.
In sum it could be concluded that there seems to have 
been a decrease in Indian dependence on the Soviet Union 
in the first decade of the treaty relationship. Nevertheless 
there still exists a mutual need for each other. While 
this has provided for a relatively stable relationship it 
has not resulted in the Soviet Union acquiring a substantial 
and predictable leverage over Indian foreign policy.
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APPENDIX: TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION 
BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF INDIA
Wishing to expand and strengthen the existing relations 
of sincere friendship between them,
considering that the further development of friendship 
and co-operation meets the basic national interests of both 
states as well as the interests of a lasting peace in Asia 
and throughout the world,
being determined to contribute to strengthening world 
peace and security and to work tirelessly to bring about a 
relaxation of international tension and the final abolition 
of the remnants of colonialism,
reaffirming their firm belief in the principles of 
peaceful co-existence and co-operation between states with 
different political and social systems,
convinced that in the present-day world international 
problems can be solved only through co-operation and not 
through conflict,
reaffirming their determination to follow the objectives 
and principles of the United Nations Charter,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one 
hand, and the Republic of India, on the other, have decided 
to conclude the present Treaty and with this aim in view 
have appointed the following plenipotentiaries:
on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - 
the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. A.A. Gromyko,
on behalf of the Republic of India - the Minister of 
External Affairs of India Swaran Singh,
who, upon presentation of their credentials, found in 
due form and proper order, agreed on the following:
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that there 
shall be a lasting peace and friendship between their two 
countries and their peoples. Each shall respect the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs 
of the other Party. The High Contracting Parties shall 
continue to develop and strengthen the relations of sincere 
friendship, good-neighborliness and all-round co-operation 
existing between them, on the basis of the above-mentioned 
principles as well as the principles of equality and mutual 
benefit.
Article 2
Guided by a desire to contribute in every way towards 
ensuring a lasting peace and the security of their peoples, 
the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to 
continue efforts towards maintaining and strengthening peace 
in Asia and throughout the world, ending the arms race and 
achieving general and complete disarmament covering both 
nuclear and conventional weapons under effective international 
control.
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Article 3
Guided by their devotion to the lofty ideal of equality 
of all peoples and states, irrespective of race or creed, 
the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racism 
in all forms and manifestations and reaffirm their determination 
to strive for their final and complete abolition.
The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate with 
other states in achieving these aims and to support the just 
aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against 
colonialism and racial domination.
Article 4
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's 
policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy is 
an important factor for maintaining universal peace and 
international security and for easing tension in the world.
The Republic of India respects the peaceful policy of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening 
friendship and co-operation with all peoples.
Article 5
Being deeply interested in ensuring world peace and 
security, and attaching great importance to mutual co-operation 
in the international arena to achieve these aims, the High 
Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts with 
each other on major international problems affecting the 
interests of both states, through meetings and exchanges 
of opinion between their leading statesmen, visits by official 
delegations and special representatives of the two governments, 
and through diplomatic channels.
Article 6
Attaching great importance to economic, scientific 
and technical co-operation between them, the High Contracting 
Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually 
advantageous and all-round co-operation in these fields 
and also to expand their co-operation in the fields of trade, 
transport and communications on the basis of the principles 
of equality, mutual advantage and the most favoured nation 
prinicple in compliance with the existing agreements and 
special agreements with neighboring countries, as it is 
stipulated in the trade agreement between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and India of December 26, 1970.
Article 7
The High Contracting Parties shall promote the further 
development of the relations and contacts between them in 
the fields of science, art, literature, education, health 
care, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sport.
Article 8
In accordance with the traditional friendship established 
between the two countries, each of the High Contracting 
Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or 
participate in any military alliances directed against the 
other Party.
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Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to 
refrain from any aggression against the other Party and 
not to allow the use of its territory for committing any 
act that may cause military damage to the other High 
Contracting Party.
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to 
refrain from giving any assistance to any third Party taking 
part in an armed conflict with the other Party. In the 
event that any of the Parties is attacked or threatened with 
attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately start 
mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat 
and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace 
and security for their countries.
Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declared 
that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, 
with regard to one or more states incompatible with the 
present Treaty. Each of the High Contracting Parties declares 
further that it has no commitments towards any other state 
or states and shall not undertake any commitments that may 
cause military damage to the other Party.
The present Treaty is signed for a term of twenty years 
and shall be prolonged automatically for every subsequent 
period of five years unless one of the High Contracting 
Parties declares its intention to terminate its operation 
by notifying the other High Contracting Party 12 months 
before the expiration of the term of the Treaty.
The Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come 
into force on the day the instruments of ratification are 
exchanged, which will be effected in Moscow within one month 
after the signing of the present Treaty.
Any differences in interpreting any article or articles 
of the present Treaty that may arise between the High 
Contracting Parties shall be settled on a bilateral basis 
by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and 
understanding.
The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present Treaty in Russian, Hindi and English, all the texts 
being equally authentic, and affixed their seals thereto.
Done in New Delhi on August 9, 1971.
Article 9
Article 10
Article 11
Article 12
For the Union 
of Soviet Socialist 
Republics
A. GROMYKO,
Minister
of Foreign Affairs
For the Republic 
of India 
SWARAN SINGH, 
Minister
of External Affairs
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